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   INTRODUCTION 
In 1973 John Henry Merryman noted that property law is a 
largely unexplored field of comparative study.1 According to 
Merryman, common lawyers and civilians have long viewed their 
respective property systems as radically different and hardly 
comparable. In Merryman’s words, the civil law is a law of 
“ownership,” while the common law is a law of “estate.”2 Civil law 
systems conceive of property as ownership, as holistic dominion: 
exclusive, single, indivisible, and different in nature from lesser 
property interests.3 By contrast, property in the common law is 
pluralistic and fragmented, having at its core the estates system and 
the many ways of carving up lesser property interests, from life 
estates to defeasible fees and future interests.4 
Forty years have passed since Merryman’s observations. 
Comparative property law is still a largely unexplored field, and civil 
law property and common law property are still perceived as 
 
 1.  John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate, 48 TUL. L. REV. 916, 916 (1974). 
 2.  Id. at 918; see also Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil 
Versus Common Law Property 2–3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2011/chang_smith.pdf (analyzing the distinct emphases of 
common law and civil law, and offering a “transaction cost” explanation for the differences). 
 3.  See Vera Bolgar, Commentary, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 204, 
210 (1953) (noting that the concept of autonomous and indivisible ownership was first 
formulated in the Justinian Code, then forgotten for centuries and then again declared in article 
544 of the French Civil Code); Hessel E. Yntema, Roman Law and Its Influence on Western 
Civilization, 35 CORNELL L. REV. 77, 77–78, 87 (1949) (discussing the development of Roman law 
and its formal adoption by later civilizations, forming modern civil law). In their respective 
codifications Justinian and Napoleon sought to simplify an intricate network of customs, 
precedents, and local ordinances. Justinian sought to restore the classical concepts of a bygone 
capitalistic era. Napoleon sought to consolidate the outcomes of the revolution and in particular 
the abolition of feudal charges. Bolgar, supra, at 210. 
 4.  Chang & Smith, supra note 2, at 2.  
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fundamentally different. In the United States, every first-year law 
student learns that property is a “bundle of sticks.” Introduced by 
Hohfeld, and further developed by the realists, the bundle of sticks 
concept characterizes property as a bundle of entitlements regulating 
relations among persons concerning a valued resource.5 The metaphor 
suggests that the bundle is malleable (i.e., that private actors, courts, 
and lawmakers may add or remove sticks, and that the bundle 
structures relations among persons, only secondarily and incidentally 
involving a thing). By contrast, in civil law countries, a law student 
may easily graduate without having ever heard that property is a 
bundle of rights. By and large, civil lawyers still view property as 
ownership.6 For civil law jurists, property is still a coherent and 
monolithic aggregate of entitlements over a thing, giving the owner an 
ample sphere of negative freedom (i.e., ample power to use the thing 
free from interference by nonowners or by the state).7 
This conventional picture of comparative property raises a 
number of questions. Are Europeans actually unsophisticated old-style 
conceptualists who simply missed the realist revolution in property 
law? Furthermore, are the bundle of sticks concept and the ownership 
concept the only models to have been developed in the history of 
Western property law? 
This Article provides a new answer to both questions. It argues 
that Europeans had their own realist revolution in property law. 
Further, it argues that the concept of property this realism ushered in, 
which I call the “tree” concept of property, provides a better way of 
 
 5.  See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 363 (1954) 
(explaining that property consists of the relations among men and may not always involve 
external objects); see also JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW xlv (3d ed. 2002) (“Property rights 
concerns legal relations among people regarding control of valued resources.”). 
 6.  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977):  
For, in dealing with the concept of property it is possible to detect a consensus view so 
pervasive that even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual 
phrases on command. I think it is fair to say that one of the main points of the first-
year Property course is to disabuse entering law students of their primitive lay 
notions regarding ownership. They learn that only the ignorant think it meaningful to 
talk about owning things free and clear of further obligation. Instead of defining the 
relationship between a person and “his” things, property law discusses the 
relationships that arise between people with respect to things. 
 7.  Id.; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S459, S465, S467 (2002) (using proxy 
measurement to distinguish between exclusion and governance); Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not 
Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 279, 280–82 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Property Is 
Not Just a Bundle of Rights] (discussing the “exclusion strategy” as part of an alternative 
approach to property theory). 
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understanding property than either the bundle of sticks model or the 
ownership model.8 
The tree concept of property was developed by French and 
Italian jurists at approximately the same time Hohfeld and the 
realists invented and popularized the bundle of sticks concept. It rests 
on similar intuitions but still differs significantly. The tree concept 
views property as a tree with a trunk—representing the core 
entitlement that distinguishes property from other rights—and many 
branches—representing many resource-specific bundles of 
entitlements. The trunk of the tree is the owner’s entitlement to 
control the use of a resource, mindful of property’s “social function.” 
For the theorists of the tree model, the social function of property 
evokes a plurality of values: equitable distribution of resources, 
participatory management of resources, and productive efficiency. The 
branches of the property tree are the multiple resource-specific 
property regimes present in modern legal systems: family property, 
agricultural property, affordable-housing property, industrial 
property, etc. Each of these branches requires a different balance of 
the plural values evoked by the social function of property, which is 
often translated as the many resource-specific bundles of entitlements. 
The tree model of property has received virtually no attention 
by historians and comparativists. Part of the reason is that the model 
was developed in a Europe shaken by dramatic events: the crisis of 
liberalism and the rise of Fascism.9 Legal historians have long been 
reluctant to look back to the concepts and ideas discussed in Europe in 
the years of totalitarianism. For at least a generation of postwar 
European historians, these ideas were still too raw, and the personal 
and professional ties to their authors still too vivid, to allow historical 
investigation.10 It is only in recent years that a burgeoning literature 
has started excavating the debates that took place among European 
 
 8.  SALVATORE PUGLIATTI, LA PROPRIETÀ NEL NUOVO DIRITTO 149 (Dott. A. Giuffrè ed., 
1964) (using the tree image to explain the concept of property).  
 9.  On the rise of Italian Fascism, see generally ALEXANDER DE GRAND, ITALIAN FASCISM 
41–102 (2000); ADRIAN LYTTELTON, ITALIAN FASCISMS FROM PARETO TO GENTILE 11–36 (1975) 
(reviewing the individual leaders who established Fascism in Italy and answering ideological 
critiques of Italian Fascism). On the agrarian crisis, see generally MANLIO ROSSI-DORIA, 
RIFORMA AGRARIA E AZIONE MERIDIONALISTA (2003); FRANK M. SNOWDEN, VIOLENCE AND THE 
GREAT ESTATES IN THE SOUTH OF ITALY 175 (1986) (summarizing Fascist violence between 1921 
and 1922 in southern Italy). 
 10.  Michael Stolleis, Prologue to DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 1, 3–5 (Christian 
Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003) (discussing the case of Germany and arguing that 
lawyers, like the rest of the nation, “were reluctant to look back into the abyss”). It was a self-
imposed damantio memoriae, Stolleis argues, and hence it is only logical that there were very 
few studies in legal history to address the period before 1965 and that contemporary legal history 
did not take shape as a discipline until much later. 
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legal scholars in the age of totalitarianism.11 The focus of this 
literature has been mostly on public law, leaving property law largely 
to be explored.12 
By reviving the tree concept of property, this Article helps 
move property debates beyond the current impasse between the 
bundle of sticks model and the ownership model. American property 
theory has become a highly polarized field where much of the turmoil 
revolves around the respective merits of these two models.13 
Progressive property scholars resort to the bundle of sticks concept 
because it allows the state to bind up and rearrange an owner’s 
entitlements to achieve a variety of regulatory and redistributive 
goals.14 Post-Coasean law-and-economics scholars have also widely 
relied upon the bundle of sticks concept, arguing courts and private 
actors should tailor ad hoc bundles that approximate the economically 
optimal definition of property rights and guide efficient resource use.15 
By contrast, the ownership concept has been revived by 
“information theorists” of property who emphasize its advantages over 
the bundle of sticks model. Because the ownership model has 
 
 11.  See generally Stolleis, supra note 10, at 3, 13–15, 17 (detailing the hesitancy of 
European law scholars to examine law under the Nazi regime); James Q. Whitman, Of 
Corporatism, Fascism and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 750 (1991) (discussing the 
rise of literature on the nature of corporatism in the 1980s). For an example of the growing 
literature on European law and totalitarianism, see, for example, Hauke Brunkhorst, Sleeping 
Dogs: A Blemish on the Clean Slate of Western Liberalism, 7 GERMAN L.J. 83, 84 (2006) 
(analyzing the impact of Nazism on European liberalism). 
 12.  On Fascist private law, see Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Alessandro Somma, The Fascist 
Theory of Contract, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 55, 55–70 
(focusing on the modifications to Italian law of contract by Fascist and National Socialist 
governments). 
 13.  Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 917 
(2010). 
 14.  On progressive property theorists, see Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1017 (2011):  
Welfarism is no longer the only game in the town of property theory. In the last 
several years a number of property scholars have begun developing various versions of 
a general vision of property and ownership that, although consistent with welfarism 
in some respects, purports to provide an alternative to the still-dominant welfarist 
account. This alternative proceeds under different labels, including “virtue theory” 
and “progressive,” but for convenience purposes let us call them collectively “social 
obligation” theories.  
See also Baron, supra note 13, at 927–32 (illustrating progressive property theorists’ 
commitment to “human flourishing,” “virtue,” “freedom,” and “democracy”). 
 15.  For a discussion of the bundle of sticks concept in Coasean and post-Coasean law and 
economics, see Eric R. Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship, 8 
ECON. J. WATCH 205, 206–11 (2011) [hereinafter Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions]; Eric R. 
Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV 617, 621–29 (2009) 
[hereinafter Claeys, Property 101]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 368, 366–82 (2001).  
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exclusion at its core, it protects owners’ interests in using things in a 
cost-effective way by conveying the simple message of “stay off” to 
nonowners.16 Further, the ownership model is morally appealing, 
being grounded in the everyday morality of “thou shalt not steal,” 
which is simple and accessible to all members of the community.17 
There is growing dissatisfaction with both models, however. 
First, not all advocates of the ownership model agree the right to 
exclude is the core of property. Many suggest the ownership model’s 
focus on the right to exclude misses the fact that property doctrines 
are much more varied and complex than merely securing assets 
through bright-line trespass rules. The vast majority of property 
doctrines—from nuisance to adverse possession, from water rules to 
support rules—focus on use rather than on exclusion, qualifying and 
regulating owners’ abilities to use a resource.18 
Second, in the progressive property camp, many scholars 
dislike the bundle of sticks concept because it emphasizes owners’ 
rights, rather than their duties and obligations, and it masks an 
individualistic conception of property as the ownership concept.19 
Further, they recognize that, as far as its ability to allow a progressive 
regulatory or redistributive agenda is concerned, the bundle of sticks 
model is a double-edged sword. Scholars have long assumed that the 
bundle is malleable; hence, any time the state curbs one of the sticks, 
it is merely rearranging the bundle rather than taking property 
rights. But, the bundle of sticks concept may be used equally well as a 
trump against state regulation. Pursuant to this interpretation, the 
 
 16.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1850 (2007); Smith, Property is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, supra note 7, at 282–84. 
 17.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 1850. 
 18.  Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions, supra note 15, at 210 (“[N]or should my definition of 
property be confused with definitions holding that ‘property at its core entails the right to 
exclude others from a thing.’ There are subtle but important differences between a right to 
exclude and what I prefer to call a right of exclusive use-determination.”); Larissa Katz, The 
Regulative Function of Property Rights, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 236, 240 (2011) (“[T]he idea of 
ownership is found not in the exclusionary function of the right but in the owner’s exclusive 
authority to set the agenda for a resource.”); Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to 
Exclude, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 255, 255 (2011) (“I and others have sought to recover the earlier 
concept of property that was buried by the realists . . . the right to property secures a use-right 
in, agenda-setting control over, or a sphere of liberty in using the thing.”).  
 19.  On the marginality of duties to property law, see JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: 
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 197–215 (2000). On the “thin” nature of most theories of duties in 
property, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753–58 (2009); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Construction of Ownership, 1996 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 173, 174–82 (arguing that we should readjust our vision of the rights and 
responsibilities that accompany land ownership). 
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bundle has a coherent shape, and any time the state curbs a stick, it 
should pay compensation.20 
Finally, neither the ownership model nor the bundle of sticks 
model accounts for the increasingly resource-specific nature of 
property law. Social, economic, and technological changes have 
transformed the nature of certain resources, creating regulatory 
dilemmas that are resource specific. For example, today the value of a 
home has come unbound from the four corners of an owned parcel. A 
home now serves as the placeholder for other resources, such as 
schools and social associations, that are not contained within the 
physical boundaries of the parcel. Property scholars have responded to 
this transformation by suggesting a reconfiguration of homeownership 
entitlements that would not only address extraparcel impacts but also 
do a better job of protecting homeowners’ interests.21 Similarly, the 
unique physical characteristics of ecologically sensitive lands require a 
reconfiguration of owners’ entitlements, such as use and exclusion 
rights, as well as their entitlements to be immune from loss.22 In other 
words, property is increasingly becoming a constellation of resource-
specific regimes.23 
While there is growing dissatisfaction with both the bundle of 
sticks model and the “ownership” model, no alternative has emerged. 
The tree concept of property addresses the reasons for dissatisfaction 
with the other two models and resonates with insights that are 
emerging in American property theory. More specifically, the tree 
concept of property provides the historical background for 
contemporary theories of value pluralism in property law. 
The tree concept of property provides an account of property 
that would enrich contemporary property debates. It is descriptively 
accurate and normatively rich. First, the tree concept of property is 
concerned with the structure of property, as information theorists are; 
but, rather than envisioning property as having a simple architecture 
 
 20.  Alexander, supra note 19, at 800–01 (“[T]he bundle-of-rights metaphor is an 
unsatisfactory way of explaining why the statute is valid because it really begs the question. One 
could just as easily argue, as Epstein has, that the bundle of rights is unitary so that removing 
any one twig from the bundle itself constitutes a taking.”); Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions, 
supra note 15, at 211; Richard A. Epstein, Bundle of Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist 
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 223, 226–33 (2011). 
 21.  LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES 9–24 (2009). 
 22.  Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 306–10 (2002). 
 23.  See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530–31 (1989) (arguing that property rights are becoming context-
specific use rights).  
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with exclusion at its core, it emphasizes the complexity of the 
structure of property. The tree model more accurately describes the 
trunk of the property tree as the owner’s qualified right to govern the 
use of the resource, rather than as an abstract right to exclude. 
Second, the tree concept of property emphasizes that owners 
have a duty to exercise their control rights mindful of property’s social 
function, and translates this general obligation into rules concerning 
the use of specific resources. Hence, the tree concept underscores the 
importance of the duties that owners of particular resources (such as 
water, agricultural land, wetlands, or housing) owe to nonowners and 
society at large. 
Third, by acknowledging that the social function of property 
refers to a plurality of goals, including equitable distribution, 
participatory control, and efficiency, the tree concept of property 
provides a more nuanced account of the normative commitments of 
property law. This concept is richer than the ownership model, which 
sees exclusion as the means for promoting one end: the efficient use of 
resources. 
Finally, by making resources the entry point of property 
analysis, the tree concept of property eases the fundamental problem 
faced by advocates of value pluralism in property: choosing between 
conflicting values. When grounded in the context of specific resources, 
the conflict between competing goals appears less intractable: 
contestable but nonarbitrary.24 
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I sets the stage 
for the analysis of the tree concept of property by discussing the two 
rival models: the bundle of sticks concept of property and the 
ownership model. Part II discusses the development of the tree model 
of property in mid-twentieth-century property debates. Part III 
discusses why the tree concept of property provides a better 
understanding of property than the bundle of sticks model and the 
ownership model. 
 
 24.  HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS xii, 1, 3–36 (2011); Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2009); Alexander, 
supra note 14, at 1045–51. 
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 I. THE BUNDLE OF STICKS MODEL AND THE OWNERSHIP MODEL OF 
PROPERTY 
A. The Bundle of Sticks Model 
The ownership model has provided the dominant 
understanding of property in the West since the Enlightenment.25 The 
ownership model views property as a coherent and monolithic 
aggregate of entitlements that give an owner ample power over a 
resource. Blackstone’s widely cited assertion that property is “that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe” brought this model to fame.26 It was 
eventually enshrined in the most influential of the Western codes, the 
French Code Napoleon. Article 54 recited that property is “the right of 
enjoying and disposing of things in the most absolute manner provided 
that they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws or the 
statues.”27 
By the early twentieth century, however, a group of jurists in 
the United States developed an alternative model. In a 1922 article, 
Arthur Corbin noted that “our concept of property has shifted . . . . 
Property has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all and 
has become merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, 
privileges, immunities.”28 While the image of a bundle may be credited 
to an 1888 treatise on eminent domain, the bundle of sticks concept is 
the result of the combined efforts of early twentieth-century analytical 
jurisprudence: progressivism and legal realism.29 It was developed in 
 
 25.  On the development of the idea of ownership in the West, see PETER GARNSEY, 
THINKING ABOUT PROPERTY: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1–5 (2007). 
 26.  On the Blackstonian concept of property and its disintegration in modern United 
States, see generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980).  
 27.  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 544 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
content/download/1950/13681/version/3/file/Code_22.pdf (English transl.). 
 28.  Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 
(1922).  
 29.  Legal historians debate the nature of the relationship between these movements. While 
some emphasize continuity, others suggest a discontinuity approach that views realism as an 
autonomous movement. For the discontinuity view, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: 
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1013–
28 (1972). For the continuity view, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: 
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 312 (1997); NEIL 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65–158 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 145–92 
(1992).  
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years that were “among the most tumultuous in American history.”30 
As capitalism bloomed, wealth became increasingly dephysicalized. 
The country underwent successive depressions, and wealth and power 
became increasingly concentrated.31 The bundle of sticks concept 
seemed to better account for these developments. It reflected the 
dephysicalization, and it allowed greater flexibility in regulating 
property. 
The origins and the development of the idea that property is a 
bundle of rights have been thoroughly investigated by U.S. property 
scholars and legal historians.32 In this section, rather than rehearsing 
this literature, I will lay the ground for my analysis of the European 
tree concept of property by discussing the most important intuitions 
behind the bundle of sticks image. I believe these intuitions are 
fourfold: (1) property is a set of analytically distinct entitlements 
rather than a full and monolithic aggregate of rights; (2) property 
entails delicate relations among individuals concerning a given 
resource (i.e., each owner’s entitlements correspond to other owners’ 
vulnerabilities); (3) an owner’s entitlements are “bundled” and backed 
by the state, rather than derived from the law of nature; and (4) the 
property bundle is malleable (i.e., the owner’s entitlements may be 
recombined into different bundles to achieve a variety of policy 
purposes).33 
1. Property as a Set of Analytically Distinct Entitlements 
The first contribution of the bundle of rights image was that it 
brought analytical clarity to the concept of property. It made clear 
that property is not a monolithic aggregate of powers but a set of 
distinct entitlements. This clarification originated in the concern with 
clarity and systematization typical of early twentieth-century 
analytical jurisprudence.34 Jurists like Wesley Hohfeld, Henry Terry, 
 
 30.  ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 313 (citing ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE 1 (1991)). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 319. Alexander notes that Hohfeld seems not to have used the bundle of rights 
metaphor at all. Id. at 322 n.40. The first use of the metaphor to describe the modern concept of 
property, Alexander notes, is in HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 145; JOHN LEWIS, TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1888); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 15 (1990). 
 33.  ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 319 (arguing that the metaphor was intended to signify 
three key insights: first, it indicates that ownership is a complex legal relationship; second, it 
illuminates the fact that the constitutive elements of that relationship are legal rights; and third, 
and most importantly, it underscores the social character of that relationship).  
 34.  On the “jural relations” debate in early twentieth-century analytical jurisprudence, see 
generally Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham 
to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 987–89. 
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Albert Kocourek, and Arthur Corbin believed in the need for “an 
exhaustive analysis of legal conceptions, the results of which must be 
expressed in a systematized terminology.”35 
In a 1903 essay, Henry Terry first attempted to analyze 
separately the entitlements that make up the Blackstonian monolithic 
right of property. For Terry, the elementary rights of property are the 
right to possess, use, and transfer; the right to have law protect both 
the fact of one’s possession and the physical condition of the thing; and 
the powers of appointment and liens.36 Nevertheless, Hohfeld, in his 
1913 and 1917 essays, was the scholar to clearly distinguish and name 
the four primary legal entitlements of an owner.37 The fact that A is 
the fee-simple owner of Blackacre, Hohfeld noted, means that his 
property relating to the tangible object we call land consists of a 
complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and 
immunities.38 First, A has a legal right that others may not enter the 
land or cause physical harm to the land. Second, A has an indefinite 
number of legal privileges of entering the land, using the land, and 
harming the land. Third, A has the legal power to alienate his legal 
interest to another. Finally, A has an indefinite number of legal 
immunities, among which are the immunity that no ordinary person 
can alienate A’s aggregate of jural relations to another, and the 
immunity that no ordinary person can extinguish A’s privileges of 
using the land.39 As the bundle of rights approach became the 
predominant view, others further specified the standard incidents of 
property. Well known is Tony Honore’s list of the eleven standard 
incidents of full liberal ownership in Western legal systems.40 
 
 35.  Henry T. Terry, Legal Duties and Rights, 12 YALE L.J. 185, 185 (1903).  
 36.  Id. at 199. 
 37.  Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 YALE L.J. 710, 714–70 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning]; Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24–53 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning].  
 38.  Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, supra note 
37, at 746. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  A. M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (A. G. Guest ed., 
1961). For a variation on Honore’s list, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18–20 (1977). For a combination and extension of Hohfeld’s and 
Honore’s views, see MUNZER, supra note 32, at 22–28. The rights Munzer identifies are: (1) the 
right to possess; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to manage; (4) the right to income of the thing; 
(5) the right to the capital; (6) the right to security; (7) the incident of transmissibility; (8) the 
incident of absence of term; (9) the duty to prevent harm; (10) the liability to execution; and (11) 
the incident of residuarity. 
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While in the ownership model these entitlements constituted a 
monolithic aggregate, Hohfeld and Terry made clear that the 
entitlements are distinct and may be disaggregated. Hohfeld did not 
deny that, in order to have an adequate analytical view of property, it 
is important to see all these various constitutive elements in the 
aggregate.41 But, he noted, equally important is that the different 
elements should not be loosely confused with one another.42 
2. The Relational Nature of Property 
The second crucial intuition of the bundle of rights approach is 
the relational nature of property. In the ownership model, property is 
a relation between a person and a physical thing. The bundle of sticks 
concept made it clear that property is a relation among persons 
concerning a thing. As Arthur Corbin put it, all jural relations are 
between persons, either as individuals or in groups. Things, Corbin 
wrote, do not have rights, and there is no legal relation between a 
person and a thing.43 Property is a relation among persons, in that to 
each of the owner’s entitlements corresponds a vulnerability on the 
part of others.44 
Terry discussed the relational nature of property rights when 
he distinguished between the owner’s “permissive rights” and 
“protected rights.” The right to possess, use, and transfer are, for 
Terry, permissive rights. Permissive rights are not corroborated by a 
duty to others. The content of these rights, Terry noted, is an act, but 
“the act is to be done by the holder of the right himself and not by the 
person subject to a corresponding duty.”45 Indeed, he continued, “there 
is no such person and no such duty.”46 Permissive rights to possess, 
use, and transfer can be exercised but not violated.47 By contrast, 
protected rights are corroborated by duties imposed on others. Owners 
have a protected right of possession and a protected right to the 
condition of the thing. A protected right, Terry wrote, “is the legal 
condition of a person for whom the law protects a state of fact by 
imposing duties upon other persons whose performance will or will 
 
 41.  Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, supra note 
37, at 747. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 509 n.11 (1924).  
 44.  Stephen R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds on to His Collection of Sticks, 8 ECON. J. 
WATCH 265, 265–67 (2011); Singer, supra note 34, at 987. 
 45.  Terry, supra note 35, at 189. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. 
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tend to bring the state of fact into existence.”48 The protected state of 
fact (i.e., possession or the condition of the thing) is the content of the 
right; hence a protected right cannot be exercised but can be 
violated.49 
Terry’s distinction between protected and permissive rights 
was a first, incomplete, and imperfect attempt at describing the 
relational nature of property. The concept was fully clarified in 
Hohfeld’s full-blown table of correlatives, which linked each of the 
owner’s entitlements to a correlative.50 If A, fee-simple owner of 
Blackacre, has a right that others shall not enter or cause physical 
harm to the land, these others are under a correlative duty not to 
enter or cause harm. A’s indefinite number of privileges of doing on, or 
to, the land what he pleases corresponds to the respective legal “no-
rights” of other persons. The correlative of a privilege, Hohfeld 
explains, is a “no right,” there being no term available to express the 
idea that A’s privilege of entering the land corresponds to X’s no right 
that A shall not enter. Further, A’s power to transfer his full 
aggregate of entitlements to another, or to transfer a smaller 
aggregate, for example by creating a life estate in another and a 
reversion in himself, correspond to legal liabilities in other persons. 
That is, “[O]ther persons are subject, nolens volens, to the changes of 
jural relations involved in the exercise of A’s powers.”51 Finally, A’s 
immunities, for example A’s immunity that no ordinary person can 
transfer A’s aggregate of entitlements to another, or that no ordinary 
person can extinguish A’s own privileges of using the land, correlate to 
other persons’ respective disabilities in general.52 
Emphasis on the relational nature of property had important 
conceptual and policy implications. At the level of conceptual analysis, 
the notion that property is a relation among individuals regarding a 
thing led jurists to revisit and clarify the traditional distinction 
between rights in rem and rights in personam. Rights in rem are 
rights with respect to things and are available against the world at 
large. By contrast, rights in personam are rights residing in persons 
and are available against named persons or entities. Corbin, Terry, 
 
 48.  Id. at 194. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  See Singer, supra note 34, at 1039–40 (arguing that Terry’s notion of protected rights 
has two problems from a Hohfeldian standpoint: first, protected rights are merely legally 
protected interests and not rights at all—it merely describes the legal interest that is being 
protected—and second, protected rights obscure the relationship between liberties and rights). 
 51.  Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, supra note 
37, at 746. 
 52.  See id. (laying out this line of reasoning).  
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and Hohfeld argued that the distinction rested on a point of confusion. 
In Corbin’s words, “[I]t would be an extremely useful social 
achievement if people could be made to understand that property 
rights (rights in rem) are just as personal as are contract rights and 
other rights in personam.”53 Corbin, Terry, and Hohfeld argued that in 
rem rights are nothing more than clusters of in personam rights and 
hence can be broken down into a large and indefinite number of 
individual in personam rights.54 
Hohfeld renamed in rem rights “multitital” rights. He described 
a multitital right as “one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet 
separate rights, actual and potential residing in a single person,” and 
having as its correlative “fundamentally similar rights or claims, 
residing respectively in many different persons.”55 By contrast, a right 
in personam, renamed a “paucital” right, is either a unique right 
residing in a person and availing against a single person, or one of few 
fundamentally similar yet separate rights availing respectively 
against a few definite persons.56 In other words, in rem and in 
personam— or, better, multitital and paucital—rights are intrinsically 
of the same nature and differ only as to the number of companions 
they have. The former have many companions, the latter few, if any.57 
As an illustration, Hohfeld described a situation where A is the owner 
of Blackacre, and X is the owner of Whiteacre. In consideration of a 
sum paid by A to B, the latter agrees not to enter X’s Whiteacre. It is 
clear, Hohfeld notes, that A’s right against B regarding Whiteacre is a 
right in personam, and, by contrast, A’s right against B regarding 
Blackacre is a right in rem. However, it is also evident that A’s 
Blackacre right against B and A’s Whiteacre right against B are 
intrinsically of the same nature. The Blackacre right differs only 
extrinsically in having many fundamentally similar rights as its 
companions.58 
 
 53.  Corbin, supra note 43, at 509; Arthur L. Corbin Jural Relations and Their 
Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 227 (1921) (noting that it is “pleasant” that even a critic of 
Hohfeld like Albert Kocourek recognized that a jural relation is always that of one individual 
person to another). This fact, Corbin adds, has a very far-reaching effect upon much juristic 
thought and expression. Id.  
 54.  See Thomas W. Merril & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 786 (2001) (arguing that Hohfeld conceived of in rem rights “as a kind of cluster 
bomb of actual and potential in personam rights”). 
 55.  Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, supra note 
37, at 718, 745. 
 56.  Id. at 718.  
 57.  Id. at 723.  
 58.  Id. 
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At both a practical and a policy level, the effort to clarify the 
relational nature of property rights paved the way for a further, 
important insight: the realization that property entails coercion. 
Hohfeld noted that understanding the right-duty pair is not only a 
matter of accurate analysis, but also a matter “of great practical 
consequence and economic significance.”59 This is because the right-
duty relation confers to the right holder significant economic power 
over others. Hohfeld noted that some believe that owners’ rights are 
created by the law for the sole purpose of protecting the owners’ use 
and enjoyment of their property. This implies that the use was the 
only economically relevant factor in the creation of the right. 
But this view is inadequate. It fails to see value in exclusion of 
nonowners even if the owner has no intention of using the land and 
the land is vacant. Hohfeld’s limitations become clear when the 
nonowner’s use is temporary but of great economic significance. 
Others who seek to use the land will need to compensate the owner for 
the extinguishment of his rights and the creation of privileges of use 
and enjoyment. Hence, Hohfeld’s table of correlatives highlighted the 
social and political dimensions of legal decisions recognizing a right in 
an owner.60 
A few years later, the realists adopted, as a dominant theme, 
the notion of property as a sovereign power compelling service and 
obedience. This theme reflected a preoccupation of New Deal 
administrators. Throughout the 1930s, the goal of establishing a fairer 
distribution of wealth and a comprehensive welfare state dominated 
the American political agenda.61 Morris Cohen famously noted that if 
someone else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or the plow 
that the law calls his, “he has to get my consent.”62 Hence, “[t]o the 
 
 59.  Id. at 747.  
 60.  See id. (underscoring the practical consequences of properly delineating property 
rights).  
 61.  ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 313–14 (describing the period between 1890 and 1913 as 
one of increasing concentration of capital and wealth that widened the gaps between the haves 
and the have-nots, deepened feelings of social conflict, and resulted in unprecedented political 
clout for leftist political groups, such as the “Industrial Workers of the World”—an anarcho-
syndicalist group—and the Populist Party, as working people came to regard the existing 
distribution of wealth as fundamentally unjust); Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American 
Legal Realism, 12 LEGAL STUD. 137, 155–56 (1992):  
Throughout the 1930s, the goal of economic recovery dominated the American political 
agenda to such degree that more traditional liberal democratic concerns were 
somewhat overshadowed. New Deal administrators were preoccupied primarily with 
establishing a fairer distribution of wealth, a comprehensive welfare state, remedies 
for rural poverty and general unemployment, a system of coordinated planning and 
control of the physical resources of the nation—with establishing, in short, a 
comprehensive programme of public welfare. 
 62.  Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 12 (1927). 
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extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the 
law confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I 
want.”63 Modern writers had seen the concept of property ushered in 
by the modern revolutions as having freed individuals from the 
shackles of feudal oppression. By contrast, the realists showed that 
the sovereign power possessed by the modern large-property owners is 
not less real or less extensive than the power of a feudal lord.64 Robert 
Hale illustrated this point by examining the property rights of the 
owner of a large manufacturing plant. In Hohfeldian terms, Hale 
noted, the right of ownership in a manufacturing plant is a privilege to 
operate the plant, plus a privilege not to operate it, plus a right to 
keep others from operating it, plus a power to acquire all the rights of 
ownership in the products. Having exercised the latter power, Hale 
continued, “the owner has a privilege to use them plus a much more 
significant right to keep others from using them, plus a power to 
change the duty thereby implied in the others into a privilege coupled 
with rights.”65 This power, Hale clarified, is a power to release (and 
create) a pressure on the liberty of others through the law of property. 
If the legal pressure is great, the owner may be able to compel the 
others to pay him a big price for their release. If the pressure is slight, 
he can collect but a small income from his ownership.66 
3. Property as a Bundle Assembled and Backed by the State 
The third fundamental intuition of the bundle of rights 
approach is that the state itself assembles and backs owners’ bundles 
of entitlements. In 1893, John R. Commons wrote that property is “not 
a single absolute right, but a bundle of rights. The different rights 
which compose it may be distributed among individuals and society.” 
Commons did not specify who distributes the sticks in the bundle, but 
many passages from the realists suggest that the state is the actor 
that assembles and shapes the bundle. The realists made it clear that 
property rights are state-backed entitlements rather than natural 
rights. The idea that property is a natural right—a right guaranteed 
by natural law, which is the set of universally valid legal and moral 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 13.  
 65.  Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. 
REV. 209, 214 (1922). 
 66.  Id.; see also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923) (“What is the government doing when it ‘protects a 
property right’? Passively, it is abstaining from Interference with the owner when he deals with 
the thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-owner to desist from handling it, unless the owner 
consents.”). 
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principles that can be inferred from nature—was central to the 
political sensibilities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
realists argued that establishing the presence of a natural right to 
property is meaningless unless the law of the state recognizes and 
protects that right. From this perspective, property relationships 
always involve government.67 
Discussing Hohfeld’s right-duty pair, Arthur Corbin noted that 
a right exists when its possessor has the aid of some organized 
governmental society in controlling the conduct of the person who 
owes a duty.68 When we think about property rights, Corbin noted, 
what we think is, “What will society do for A (owner) against whom it 
may concern?”69 In other words, property rights require the command 
of society—with the threat of societal coercion—against an individual, 
for the benefit of A. Similarly, Morris Cohen stated that the essence of 
property is a state-enforced right to exclude others.70 In Cohen’s 
words: 
[T]he law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability of actually using what it 
calls mine; it may indirectly aid me by removing certain general hindrances to the 
enjoyment of property . . . . But the law of property helps me directly only to exclude 
others from using the things which it assigns to me.71 
While the realists insisted that the sticks are bundled top-down 
by the state, critics have noted that nothing in the bundle of rights 
conception of property drives this conclusion. Richard Epstein has 
argued that the bundle of rights terminology and the question of 
whether we think of property from a top-down or a bottom-up 
perspective are separate questions.72 The bundle of rights concept can 
also be seen in the context of a bottom-up perspective where property 
entitlements arise under natural law before the creation of the state. 
Both Roman law and the common law, Epstein notes, “initiated a 
system of private property from the bottom up: first possession of land 
(i.e., occupation) was the only mode by which to acquire property.”73 In 
Justinian’s Institutes, Epstein further notes, even common property 
 
 67.  Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371 (1954) 
(“Would you say then that there is no property without sovereignty and that property 
relationships always involve government, in other words that property is a function of 
government or sovereignty?”). 
 68.  See Corbin, supra note 43, at 502 (arguing that the government’s willingness to 
recognize and enforce such a duty creates the right). 
 69.  Id. at 509. 
 70.  See Cohen, supra note 62, at 12 (defining property rights in terms of governmental 
enforceability). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Epstein, supra note 20, at 227. 
 73.  Id. at 229. 
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(i.e., air, lakes, rivers, and the shoreline) arises under natural law, 
giving access to these resources to all individuals in their private 
capacities with no element of centralized control.74 
4. Property as a Malleable Bundle 
The fourth fundamental intuition of the bundle of rights 
approach is that the bundle is malleable rather than having a prefixed 
and coherent structure or essence. Courts and legislatures may shape 
an owner’s bundle in a variety of ways for regulatory or redistributive 
purposes. They may take out or curb specific sticks, and the bundle 
will still be property. Hohfeld paved the way for this intuition by 
arguing that the design of jural relations—for example, whether a 
privilege or liberty to deal with others at will should be paired with 
any peculiar concomitant rights against third parties as regards 
certain types of interference—is ultimately a question of justice and 
policy.75 The realists carried Hohfeld’s argument further. Property is 
neither a preexisting economic nor ethical fact. Property rights are 
shaped by courts and legislatures based on considerations of policy or 
ethics. “Orthodox legal theology,” as Felix Cohen called conceptualist 
legal reasoning, obscures the design work done by courts.76 The 
property rights of utility companies provide a good illustration of how 
courts shape the property bundle. In Felix Cohen’s words, the actual 
value of a utility’s property is a function of courts’ decisions, and 
courts’ decisions cannot be based in fact upon the actual value of the 
property. Courts create that value; prior to their decisions, it is not an 
economic fact. Nor is the value an ethical fact based upon a 
determination, in light of social facts and social policies, of the amount 
that a given utility ought to be allowed to charge its patrons.77 
If property is a variable bundle of sticks, rather than a 
preexisting and fixed package, courts and legislatures may add or 
remove sticks to achieve a variety of social goals. For example, at 
times, because large-property owners exert power on others, the 
government includes in their bundle not only rights but also duties. As 
an illustration, Morris Cohen noted:  
 
 74.  Id. at 228. 
 75.  Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
supra note 37, at 36. 
 76.  Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 815–18 (1935). 
 77.  See id. at 818 (using utility providers as an example of judicial shaping of property 
rights). 
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[T]he owner of a tenement house in a modern city is in fact a public official and has all 
sorts of positive duties. He must keep the halls lighted, he must see that the roof does 
not leak, that there are fire escape facilities, he must remove tenants guilty of certain 
public immoralities etc and he is compensated by the fees of his tenants which the law is 
beginning to regulate.78  
Similarly, Cohen continued, there is generally no reason to insist that 
people should make the most economic use of their property. By and 
large, owners make good use of their property out of self-interest, and 
the cost of government enforcement would be prohibitive. “Yet,” Cohen 
added, “there may be times, such as occurred during the late war, 
when the state may insist that man shall cultivate the soil intensively 
and be otherwise engaged in socially productive work.”79 
At other times, the government curbs owners’ entitlements. In 
regulating the rates of utilities, Hale noted, the law is experimenting 
with curbing owners’ entitlements. The revision of property rights 
worked out within the utility field may serve as a model for the 
revision of other property rights.80 In other words, the job of courts is 
to critically assess the justifications for the various sticks in the 
bundle. The result of this assessment, Hale notes, “might be radical; if 
so it would be because, on a piecemeal and candid review, many of the 
incidents of property would prove themselves to be without 
justification.”81 This judicial and legislative job of tweaking the 
owners’ entitlements, Hale argues, is vital to the very survival and 
solidity of property as an institution. “If property is not revised 
methodically by its friends,” Hale suggests, “it is likely to be revised 
unmethodically by its enemies, with disastrous results.”82 
The realists’ idea that the property bundle is malleable is 
widely accepted by property scholars as well as by the Supreme Court. 
Bruce Ackerman noted in 1977 that the “Scientific Policymaker” (i.e., 
any legal professional trained in the postrealist era) is aware that “the 
ways in which users’ rights may be packaged and distributed are 
wondrously diverse.”83 What separates the “Ordinary Observer” (i.e., 
the layman) from the Scientific Policymaker is that the former 
commits “the error of thinking that ‘the’ property owner, by virtue of 
being ‘the’ property owner must necessarily own a particular bundle of 
rights over a thing.”84 
 
 78.  Cohen, supra note 62, at 26. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See Hale, supra note 65, at 213, 216 (highlighting utilities as an example of the law 
limiting property owners’ entitlements). 
 81.  Id. at 216. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 26. 
 84.  Id. at 27. 
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The Supreme Court has also embraced this malleability view in 
regulatory-takings cases, suggesting that, because the bundle is 
malleable, a regulation that deprives the owner of only one stick does 
not amount to a taking, which would require just compensation. In 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court held that 
a historic-preservation law that deprived Grand Central Station’s 
owners of the right to develop the air rights of the Terminal site did 
not constitute a taking.85 The Court noted that “the submission that 
appellants may establish a ‘taking’ simply by showing that they have 
been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they 
heretofore had believed was available for development is quite simply 
untenable.”86 Similarly, in Andrus v. Allard, the Court held that the 
Eagle Protection Act’s ban on the sale of golden eagles or artifacts 
made with eagles’ feathers did not constitute a taking.87 Again, the 
Court suggested the bundle is malleable. “The denial of one traditional 
property right,” Justice Brennan noted, does not always amount to a 
taking. “At least where an owner possesses a ‘full’ bundle of property 
rights,” Brennan continued, the destruction of one “ ‘strand’ of the 
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its 
entirety.”88 
While the bundle of rights approach is largely thought to imply 
that the bundle is malleable and that the state may drop or curb 
sticks without taking owners’ property rights, it may easily be taken 
to suggest the opposite. For Richard Epstein, the bundle of rights 
image may be seen equally well as giving a strong and internally 
coherent notion of property.89 For Epstein, the bundle includes 
possession, use, and disposition. In other words, the bundle metaphor 
may be used to refer not to a nominalist claim about property (i.e., 
property is whatever set of sticks the state bundles together) but to a 
fixed and coherent set of entitlements. For example, Eric Claeys has 
noted that if we agree that property protects the owner’s interest to 
exclusively determine how a resource may be used, then a bundle 
 
 85.  See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 86.  Id. at 130. 
 87.  Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 68 (1979). 
 88.  Id. at 66. 
 89.  Epstein, supra note 20, at 226; see also Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 3 (1990):  
By using that [bundle of sticks] metaphor you get the impression that these sticks 
have been hastily thrown together, that they are not all quite the same length and 
that it is almost a matter of random choice that they stand next to one another. I 
suggest the bundle of rights normally associated with the concept of property, far from 
being randomly and fortuitously put together, actually coheres and forms the basis of 
huge portions of the terrain of the ordinary common law. 
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conception can explain why all the various entitlements that go into 
the bundle belong there.90 In turn, this coherent and coordinated 
bundle concept works as a trump against government confiscation.91 
The state takes property whenever it takes any stick out of an owner’s 
bundle. 
B. The Ownership Model 
Until recently, it seemed that the bundle of sticks model had 
become the dominant model. It had largely supplanted the ownership 
model in scholarly debates, gaining wide acceptance in both the law-
and-economics and progressive circles. Moreover, it had become the 
basic analytical framework taught in most law schools’ first-year 
property courses. According to Lawrence Becker, the bundle of sticks 
model was, in Kuhnian language, “normal science.” In recent years, 
however, the ownership model has regained some of its lost terrain. 
Scholars writing in the classical-liberal tradition, as well as in the 
law-and-economics approach, argue that the ownership model has 
several advantages over the bundle of sticks concept. 
1. Analytical Clarity 
The idea that the ownership model is analytically and 
descriptively preferable to the bundle of sticks concept is most 
famously associated with the work of J.E. Penner. Penner has 
repeatedly argued that the bundle of sticks concept is not simply “an 
otiose bit of intellectual flotsam”; rather, it is “positively pernicious.”92 
It obscures more than it illuminates. It obscures the distinction 
between property rights and other legal relations, and it marginalizes 
the idea of property as a right to a thing, generating the illusion that 
we can have a workable idea of property without having a workable 
idea of the things that can be owned.93 For Penner, a more precise 
 
 90.  Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions, supra note 15, at 215:  
[A]nalytically a bundle conception can explain why any slice of pizza is still pizza and 
it can describe and account for all the slices of a single pizza even if those slices come 
in different shapes and sizes. Yet one needs a separate definition of pizza to determine 
whether a bagel pizza or any slice of it really counts as pizza. So too with property.  
See also id. at 211.  
 91.  See id. at 211; Epstein, supra note 20, at 224 (“But I am a classical liberal and I think 
the bundle of rights image rightly understood offers the best path to preserving the institution of 
limited government.”). 
 92.  J. E. Penner, Potentiality, Actuality and Stick-Theory, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 274, 274–78 
(2011). 
 93.  See J. E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 724 
(1996).  
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reformulation of the layman’s idea that property is a right to a thing—
an idea widely disparaged in postrealist times—may provide a better 
grasp of the distinctive nature of property. 
Penner’s reformulation highlights two features of property: 
“thinghood” and “non-interference.” Property entails the general duty 
not to interfere with particular things. As such, property is a relation 
among persons, as the bundle of sticks concept suggests, but a relation 
that is always mediated by a thing with certain characteristics, a 
thing that is only contingently ours and could just as well be someone 
else’s. The thinghood criterion differentiates property from personal 
rights or “personality-rich” relationships, such as rights arising from a 
labor contract or the right not to be murdered.94 While we could 
notionally regard the object of the right, the contractual relation, or 
the protection of one’s life as things, the conceptual impossibility of 
separating these things from the person who has them removes them 
from the realm of things that can be property. 
The duty to respect property by noninterference is a second 
feature that distinguishes property from personal rights. This duty is 
a general duty—a blanket prohibition; it does not involve the duty 
ower in any personal dealing with the owner in order to respect his 
ownership. Penner explains: “[T]he scope of the right is not to be 
visualized as an owner’s possession of billions of personal rights 
against others, each of whom has individuated personal duties to 
every owner of property in respect of each of the things he owns. 
Rather, we all simply have a duty not to interfere with the property of 
others . . . .”95 It is an impersonal duty because we do not need to know 
who owns what to comply with it. 
2. An Efficient Delineation Strategy 
Another merit of the ownership model is that it is the most 
efficient way of designing property rights. This argument is an 
important theme in the work of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith. The 
bundle of sticks concept, Smith argues, obscures the architecture of 
property, which emerges in the course of protecting owners’ interests 
in using things in a cost-effective way.96 Property law, Smith argues, 
is a means to an end (i.e., the ability to use things and to do so with 
some security, stability, and flexibility). Property law serves this 
interest by employing a variety of delineation strategies. But, because 
 
 94.  See id. at 802–05. 
 95.  See id. at 808. 
 96.  Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, supra note 7, at 284. 
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the costs of delineation are not zero, the choice of strategy will depend 
not only on its benefits but also on its costs.97 For this reason, the 
architecture of property has at its core an exclusion strategy. An 
exclusion strategy puts a thing under an owner’s control and prohibits 
nonowners from using, possessing, or interfering in any way with the 
owner’s thing without the owner’s consent. This strategy is insensitive 
to context in that it does not require information about the uses, their 
interactions, or the user.98 Hence, the strategy is cost effective. It is a 
convenient starting point—a rough first cut. 
Exclusion is not a value or an end in itself. It is a means to an 
end.99 Nor is it absolute. This architecture based on exclusion is 
refined by a governance strategy, which often entails exceptions to the 
right to exclude.100 A governance strategy deals with spillover effects 
and scale problems by facilitating coordination between uses. It 
requires contextual information about the nature of uses and their 
interactions, as well as about users, and hence it is more costly. It is 
supplied by government or through fine-grained contracting among 
interested parties. In a zero-transaction-cost world, we could use 
governance all the time, but in our world, contextualized governance 
is too costly.101 The bundle of sticks model misses this architecture 
made of a core of exclusion refined by governance. It misses the fact 
that the right to exclude is not a stick or a freestanding interest that 
can be added or subtracted without changing the rest of the setup. 
Rather, the right to exclude is the core of property; it is an integral 
product of this delineation process.102 As Thomas Merrill put it, “[T]he 
 
 97.  Id. at 281. 
 98.  Id. at 282. 
 99.  Id. at 281. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 282.  
 102.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Right to Exclude] (describing the right to exclude as the sin que non 
of property rights). Thomas Merrill has suggested replacing the bundle metaphor with the image 
of property as a prism. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 247, 254 
(2011) [hereinafter Merrill, The Property Prism]. For Merrill, like the bundle metaphor, the 
prism image conveys the complexity of property, the fact that property is heterogeneous and 
cannot be reduced to simple maxims about ownership sovereignty. Id. at 252. But unlike the 
bundle concept, the prism tells us that property is not a random collection of sticks but has an 
inherent structural integrity whose shape can be explained by information costs. For Merrill, 
property is a prism that takes on a different color from different angles. Each angle corresponds 
to an “audience” of property rules. From the “stranger” angle property takes on a red light: it is a 
very simple “keep out” rule. For potential transactors, who look out for particular types of 
property to purchase or rent, property takes on an amber light. Here, property presents itself in 
a finite number of standard forms: the fee simple, the trust, the easement, the condominium, etc. 
These forms are sufficiently numerous for users to achieve different objectives but sufficiently 
standardized to lower information costs. For a third audience, persons inside the “zone of privity” 
3b. di Robilant_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2013 7:48 AM 
892 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3:869 
right to exclude is more than just one of the most essential 
constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.” Give someone the 
right to exclude others from a valued resource, Merrill noted, and you 
give them property; deny someone the exclusion right, and they do not 
have property.103 
3. The Morality of Ownership 
Another merit of the ownership model, its proponents argue, is 
that it reflects and boosts the moral significance of property. In civil 
law systems, the question of the morality of the ownership model was 
an important theme in a natural law tradition running from Gratian, 
the medieval canon lawyer, to Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco 
Suarez, the Spanish Scholastics of the sixteenth century, to Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right.104 For this tradition, at first God gave the whole 
world to humans in common. Natural law obliged humans to seek 
their own perfection and gave them freedom to do whatever was 
conducive to that end. In other words, “permissive natural law” 
defined an area of human freedom where a judgment of practical 
reason could decide, according to circumstances, how to fulfill the law 
obliging to self-perfection. Because it is natural for common things to 
be neglected, and because life had lost the simplicity that had 
characterized the primeval community, permissive natural law 
authorized individuals to occupy things held in common. This 
permission had annexed a command that others should not disturb 
the occupant. Hence, it was the natural law obligation of self-
perfection that justified ownership and exclusion.105 
 
(e.g., bailors and bailees, landlords and tenants, cotenants, etc.), the prism reveals a green light. 
Persons inside this zone can bargain to achieve an immense variety of rules and practices. The 
explanation for allowing great contractual freedom is information costs. Idiosyncratic rules are 
useful to achieve a variety of purposes, and the costs of learning about these idiosyncratic rules 
are low for persons inside the zone. Finally, for the audience of neighbors, the prism reflects a 
white light. The law regulates spillover effects through a combination of ex ante rules, such as 
zoning and covenants, and ex post liability rules in nuisance. The higher information costs are 
tolerable because legal intervention to protect neighbors tends to be “episodic.” 
 103.  Merrill, The Property Prism, supra note 102, at 254.  
 104.  See Brian Tierney, Kant on Property: The Problem of Permissive Law, 62 J. HIST. IDEAS 
301, 301–12 (2001); Brian Tierney, Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant, 62 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 381, 381–99 (2001) [hereinafter Tierney, Permissive Natural Law]. 
 105.  See Tierney, Permissive Natural Law, supra note 104, at 385–87, 393–96. Tierney 
points out the contradictions in Kant’s argument. Earlier theories of natural law, from Gratian 
to Wolff, had based the permissive natural law authorizing private property on considerations of 
necessity and utility and on a view of humans as frail and sinful and yet capable of moral 
discernment and of working out institutions that would enhance human life. Because they were 
arguing on pragmatic grounds, earlier authors could formulate their theories without 
contradictions. They did not find it necessary to propose a natural law of pure reason concerning 
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Contemporary advocates of the ownership model also place the 
moral advantages of the model in the foreground. They argue that the 
bundle of rights model dismisses the traditional everyday morality of 
property and regards property rights as plastic in the hands of the 
enlightened social engineer.106 By contrast, the ownership model 
requires acknowledgement of the moral significance of property.107 
However, these theorists’ understanding of the morality of property 
differs from the natural law tradition. 
The contemporary advocates of the ownership model view the 
morality of property in instrumentalist terms. Acknowledgment of the 
moral significance of property rights is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the property system, the paramount aim of which is to 
coordinate property users in a cost-effective way.108 Merrill and Smith 
note that no system of property rights can survive unless property 
ownership is infused with moral significance. For property to work as 
a device coordinating interactions over things, the right to exclude 
must be viewed by members of the community as a moral right.109 
Both law and self-help are inadequate to achieve the level of 
compliance required. The formal legal protection of property is 
modest, both in terms of the severity of sanctions and the frequency of 
enforcement actions. Further, when the legal protection of property 
loses touch with common morality, as is the case with downloading 
copyrighted material from the Internet today, there is widespread 
 
universal freedom and hence were able to explain without contradictions how permissive natural 
law could give rise to an obligation imposed on nonowners not to interfere with owners’ property. 
Because common ownership would be neglected and would give rise to dissent and strife, 
permissive natural law authorized individuals to occupy things and imposed on nonowners a 
duty to abstain from interference. But Kant’s arguments were metaphysical, not pragmatic. 
Kant excluded any appeal to human inclinations and argued based on a concept of freedom 
understood as a pure rational concept. Hence, Kant’s argument ran into a number of 
contradictions. Kant maintained that every person had an innate right to freedom and from this 
he deduced a universal law of Right: act externally so that the free use of your choice can coexist 
with the freedom of everyone. But the person who first seized for himself what had been common 
to all evidently did encroach on the freedom of others. To solve this problem, Kant formulated a 
postulate of practical reason concerning property. He argued, citing the Roman doctrine of res 
nullius, that external things could be occupied, and he restated the postulate as a permissive law 
of practical reason that gives us authorization to put others under an obligation not to interfere 
with the occupant’s property. But to put others under an obligation is to encroach on their 
freedom, which would be a violation of the universal law of Right. It seems therefore that natural 
law contradicted itself: it prohibited and permitted an action at the same time. Id. at 381–82.  
 106.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 1867–70. 
 107.  See id. at 1868 (citing the work of Felix Cohen in establishing the necessity of a 
morality-based view of property rights). 
 108.  On the instrumental character of Smith’s moral theory of property, see Eric R. Claeys, 
Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 133, 137–39 (2012).  
 109.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 1850. 
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disregard of legally recognized property rights. Self-help is also 
unlikely to sustain a system of property rights. Self-help works best in 
communities that have a strong sense of the moral importance of 
property rights. Further, the very process of using self-help is 
governed by moral norms that tell owners when and how much to 
retaliate against an infringement of their rights.110 
The morality upon which a property system rests must be 
simple and accessible to all members of the community.111 Merrill and 
Smith acknowledge that there are different moralities of property 
coming from different sources. They do not offer a theory of the 
content of property’s morality. Instead, they argue that this morality 
must be simple, comprehensible, and suitable for all members of the 
community. Any moral theory that endorses general, simple, and 
robust rules for core property situations would be consistent with their 
view of the relation of morality to property law.112 
II. THE TREE MODEL OF PROPERTY 
A. The Political and Methodological Context for the Tree Concept of 
Property 
At approximately the same time Hohfeld and the realists were 
developing the bundle of sticks image, continental European jurists 
were also revolutionizing their understanding of the concept of 
property. They argued that the ownership concept of property adopted 
in the Code Napoleon and the other European codes was a fiction, 
rooted in the ideology of the French Revolution.113 By contrast, they 
 
 110.  See id. at 1855–56 (although these governing moral norms only work when they are 
“easy to communicate and shared by the relevant members of the population”). 
 111.  Id. at 1855. 
 112.  Id. at 1855–56. 
 113.  The impetus for the new property came from a long-felt dissatisfaction with the 
ownership concept of property. Francesco Ferrara, professor at the University of Pisa and 
prominent property scholar, started his 1935 essay Property As a Social Duty by discussing the 
shortcomings of the ownership model of property. Under the ownership approach, Ferrara noted, 
property is considered a “ius plenum in re corporali” (i.e., a unitary aggregate of rights to use and 
dispose that gives the owner the fullest and most absolute “sovereignty” over a physical thing). 
Writers who seek to define property, Ferrara further noted, highlight its abstract, universal, and 
perpetual character. The owner’s right extends to any external thing that may be used, 
regardless of the different relevance that different resources have for the public interest. In the 
case of land, the owner’s right extends to everything that is under or above the surface. The 
owner’s right confers exclusive absolute powers to use or not to use the thing. A landowner, 
Ferrara suggested, is equally acting within his right whether he productively cultivates his land 
or whether he abandons it to the weeds. In case of conflict between the owner’s right and the 
public interest, the former is to be privileged. Under the traditional approach, Ferrara notes, this 
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developed a new concept of property, the tree concept of property, that 
rested on some of the same intuitions embraced by the bundle of sticks 
approach. 
The foundations for the tree model of property were laid by 
French jurists at the beginning of the twentieth century, but most of 
the craft work was done in the 1930s in Italy.114 The proving ground 
for the tree concept was the debate over the new draft Italian Civil 
Code, which would be approved in 1942. The old 1865 Italian Civil 
Code was largely an adaptation of the French Code Napoleon.115 As 
the latter, it was a code of property (i.e., property law was the central 
pillar of the code).116 The Civil Code was organized in three books, two 
of which were devoted to property and modes of acquiring property.117 
The Civil Code’s definition of property was based on the ownership 
model. As in the Code Napoleon, property was defined as the right to 
use and dispose of things in the most absolute way, provided they are 
not used in a way prohibited by laws and regulations.118 The drafting 
of a new civil code was the occasion to draw a new concept of property 
that would reflect the many ways property law had changed in real 
life. 
The decades between 1850 and 1920 witnessed momentous 
economic, social, and political changes: the rapid industrialization of 
late blooming economies such as France and Italy, the agrarian crisis 
of the 1880s, World War I, the crisis of liberalism, and the rise of 
Fascism. Under the pressure of these events, lawmakers passed 
 
is a necessary evil. See Francesco Ferrara, La Proprietà come Dovere Sociale, in LA CONCEZIONE 
FASCISTA DELLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA 277 (1935). 
 114.  The idea of property as a tree with a unitary trunk and many branches was Pugliatti’s, 
but the intuition that property has many branches was first outlined by Louis Josserand. See 
Louis Josserand, Configuration du Droit de Propriete Dans L’ordre Juridique Noveau, in 
MELANGES SUGIYAMA 101–03 (1940):  
Even if we limit our investigation to real property, we find that, within this genre 
there are multiple species. Agricultural land is treated differently than urban real 
estate. In France a rural code is being drafted that contains all the rules regulating 
agricultural life and in most countries, most notably in Italy, an agrarian law is 
developing; a prominent legal innovation that is attracting the attention of lawmakers 
and law professors, in universities as well as in the official palaces. And other special 
regimes have developed within real property; family property has its own regime and 
so does low-income housing. 
 115.  DOMENICO CORRADINI, GARANTISMO E STATUALISMO: LE CODIFICAZIONI CIVILISTICHE 
DELL’OTTOCENTO 125 (1986); CARLO GHISALBERTI, LA CODIFICAZIONE DEL DIRITTO IN ITALIA 1865-
1942, at 251 (1985); STEFANO RODOTÀ, IL TERRIBILE DIRITTO. STUDI SULLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA 
(1990).  
 116.  CORRADINI, supra note 115, at 125–26. 
 117.  Id. at 126. 
 118.  See Codice Civile [C.c.] 1865 art. 436 (It.), available at http://giurisprudenza.unica 
.it/dlf/home/portali/unigiurisprudenza/UserFiles/File/Utenti/c.cicero/dispense/Proprieta.pdf.  
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“emergency” or “special” legislation that significantly altered the rules 
of property.119 
First, property was becoming increasingly incorporeal. Patents, 
trademarks, and fonds de commerce were new crucial intangible forms 
of property.120 Second, property rights were becoming limited and 
specialized.121 The owner’s right is not the same regardless of whether 
it pertains to a piece of furniture, an antique painting, a parcel of 
agricultural land, or an industrial plant. In both Italy and France, 
early twentieth-century legislative provisions limited the use rights 
and transfer rights of owners of things of historical and artistic 
interest.122 In Italy, starting in the 1920s, land reclamation laws 
imposed duties on owners to improve and to cultivate their land. The 
Italian government also subjected owners of utilities or industries of 
critical importance for the national economy, such as textile or 
manufacturing, to duties and limits. Emergency legislation passed 
during World War I further limited the rights of owners of specific 
resources, in particular their rights to be immune from having their 
property taken. Military authorities could temporarily occupy or use 
resources important for national security, such as land, buildings, or 
means of transportation.123 
Third, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century witnessed changes in the boundaries between 
private property and public property. The inventory of resources 
subtracted from private property and held by the state in trust for the 
public was expanded. Water, forests, and mines became largely public 
property. 
Fourth, property rights were relativized: that is, protection of 
the owner’s absolute rights was no longer the paramount concern. 
Equal access to property and promotion of the public interest became 
part of the vocabulary of property debates. In the wake of the agrarian 
crisis that struck Europe in the 1880s, the need to redress inequalities 
in the distribution of land became a heated topic of policy debates. In 
 
 119.  For a discussion of how special legislation decodified private law, i.e., marginalized the 
rules of private law contained in the Civil Code, see generally NATALINO IRTI, L’ETA DELLLA 
DECODIFICAZIONE (1989). While Irti described the process as one of decodification, Pugliatti and 
Josserand referred to special legislation as “the new legal order” (“nuovo diritto”, “ordre juridique 
noveau”). See PUGLIATTI, supra note 8; Josserand, supra note 114. 
 120.  Josserand, supra note 114, at 104. 
 121.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 1–33 (discussing the special rules for a variety of resources 
including mines, railways, water, urban streets, etc.). 
 122.  Josserand, supra note 114, at 105; Filippo Vassalli, Per Una Definizione Legislativa del 
Diritto di Proprietà, in LA CONCEZIONE FASCISTA DELLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA, supra note 113, at 
99. 
 123.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 23–24. 
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Italy and France, policymakers and lawmakers pondered the pros and 
cons of private property and common property as alternative means 
for promoting more equal access to land.124 Owners’ immunity from 
having their property taken was also becoming more limited. In 
France, for example, the decret-loi125 of August 8, 1935 modified the 
procedure for assessing just compensation in takings. Under the new 
procedure, the award was no longer determined by a jury, which 
would have been largely sympathetic to private owners. Instead, the 
award was assessed by a commission arbitrale composed of one 
contribuable—that is, a taxpayer who represented the interest of 
private owners—and a majority of public officials representing the 
interest of the government.126 
While property had become increasingly incorporeal, 
specialized, and relative under the pressure of social and economic 
change, the most dramatic change in the discourse of property lawyers 
came with the rise of Fascism in Italy. The Fascist regime sought to 
redesign property law so that it would provide the legal framework for 
the new corporatist economic system. Italian Fascism was the outcome 
of the economic and social crisis of late nineteenth-century Italy, 
which was greatly exacerbated by the First World War.127 The so-
called Liberal Italy (i.e., the liberal-constitutional monarchy that 
governed Italy between 1861 and 1919) was the creation of a tiny 
northern elite, disconnected from the mass of the population. Liberal 
Italy enjoyed rapid but uneven economic development, resulting in the 
coexistence of a modern industrial sector alongside a backward artisan 
sector and rural cottage industry. In the agricultural sector, large-
scale capitalist production in the northern Po Valley coexisted with 
the small-scale subsistence farming in the rest of the country.128 
This uneven development gave rise to a large and strong urban 
and industrial proletariat. The liberal monarchy failed to broaden its 
 
 124.  See generally PAOLO GROSSI, AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1981) (discussing 
the European controversy of collective ownership, specifically the Italian experience); NADINE 
VIVER, PROPRIETE COLLECTIVE ET IDENTITE COMMUNALE : LES BIENS COMMUNAUX EN FRANCE 
(1750-1914) (1999). For a study of collective property in different European countries, see MARIE-
DANIELLE DEMELAS & NADINE VIVIER, LES PROPRIETES COLLECTIVES FACE AUX ATTAQUES 
LIBERALES (1750-1914) (Marie-Danielle Demelas & Nadine Vivier eds., 2003). On the debate over 
common ownership in late nineteenth-century Europe, see Anna di Robilant, Common 
Ownership and Equality of Autonomy, 58 MCGILL. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
 125.  A decret-loi is a statutory order proposed by the executive. 
 126.  Josserand, supra note 114, at 104. 
 127.  On the crisis of liberalism and the rise of Fascism in Italy, see generally MARCELLO DE 
CECCO, The Economy from Liberalism to Fascism, in LIBERAL AND FASCIST ITALY 1900-1945, at 
62 (Adrian Lyttleton ed., 2002); JOHN POLLARD, THE FASCIST EXPERIENCE IN ITALY (1998); 
CHRISTOPHER SETON-WATSON, ITALY FROM LIBERALISM TO FASCISM 1870-1925 (1967).  
 128.  POLLARD, supra note 127, at 1–19. 
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base and to respond to the working class movement’s demands for 
change. World War I worsened the economic situation, exposed the 
incompetence of the liberal political class, and further radicalized the 
masses.129 The years 1918–20 witnessed mass unrest and were dubbed 
“the Two Red Years.”130 The parliamentary system became paralyzed, 
and Fascism’s rise to power was extremely rapid.131 Fascism sought to 
replace the weak liberal state with an authoritarian corporatist 
state.132 The corporatist system was seen as an alternative to the evils 
of individualistic liberalism and collectivist Bolshevism.133 
Corporatism sought to overcome social conflict by organizing society 
and the economy into associations (or corporations) of workers and 
employers and by facilitating cooperation between them in the 
national interest.134 
The new Civil Code was one of the first and most publicized 
efforts of Fascism.135 It sought to establish a new private law 
framework for the corporatist state.136 Specifically, the law of property 
was of critical importance for establishing and sustaining a corporatist 
system. The new relations of production between workers and 
employers needed to rest on new property relations. Hence, the 
Fascist regime invested a great deal of energy in the fascistization of 
property law. 
The Fascist Confederation of Agricultural Workers convened 
its first national conference of agrarian law in Rome in 1935. The topic 
of the conference was “The Fascist Concept of Private Property.” 
Fascist property scholars agreed on the importance of private 
property. Carlo Costamagna, member of the Commission of the 
Eighteen (the legislative commission that drafted the law on 
 
 129.  Id. at 19–39. 
 130.  Id. at 27–28. 
 131.  PAOLO GROSSI, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LAW 154 (Laurence Hooper trans., Wiley-
Blackwell 2010). 
 132.  Id. at 155. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 141.  
 135.  Id. at 154. 
 136.  See Whitman, supra note 11, at 752:  
The term “corporatism” is by no means easy to define. As a general matter, one can 
say that corporatism is the body of political theory that seeks to establish a modern 
guild order: an order, that is, somehow founded neither on state power nor on 
individual liberty, but on the autonomy of guild-like intermediary bodies, such as 
unions and professional associations. Yet such intermediary bodies appear in all 
modern societies; what is it that distinguishes specifically corporatist intermediate 
bodies from others? Unfortunately, the best scholars at work on the subject have 
offered discussions that are cryptic or vague; we lack the sort of definition one wants 
most for a historical study: a definition both handy and exact. 
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corporations) and professor of corporatist law, emphasized that, as 
Mussolini himself had proclaimed, private property is a fundamental 
institution of the Fascist corporatist state.137 Gino Arias, another 
member of the Commission, explained that “property complements 
personhood” and that “since property is the fruit of labor, and labor is 
the fundamental value of fascist doctrine, rejecting property would 
contradict the very foundations of fascism.”138 
Fascist property scholars did not do away with the classical-
liberal vocabulary of property, with its emphasis on personhood and 
labor. The central theme of their writings, however, was the idea that 
the individual owner’s interest is subordinated to the larger interest of 
the Fascist state. Fascist literature identified the interest of the state 
in the promotion of the necessities of national production. In Fascist 
literature, productive efficiency often prevailed over the preservation 
of ethnic purity.139 Mussolini’s project of economic autarky (i.e., 
economic self-sufficiency) made productive efficiency a priority. In the 
mid-1930s (there were a number of famous autarky speeches, one in 
Bolzano in 1935 and one in 1936, so mid-1930s is more accurate), 
Mussolini announced to the world that Italy would manage alone.140 
World War I had exposed the weaknesses of the Italian economy and 
its dependence on foreign economies. Fascism launched a huge 
propaganda campaign and a set of policy measures designed to 
achieve economic autarky. The 1927 Labor Chart (the document that 
spelled out the fundamental tenets of Fascist doctrine) exalted the 
theme of enterprise productivity and economic solidarity in the 
superior interest of the nation. Article 1 stated that “the Italian 
 
 137.  Domenico Carbone, La Proprietà Nella Dottrina Fascista, in LO STATO: RIVISTA DI 
SCIENZE GIURIDICHE, ECONOMICHE E SOCIALI 6, 16 n.7 (1936). For more information on Carlo 
Costamagna, see Monica Toraldo di Francia, Per un Corporativismo Senza Corporazioni: Lo 
Stato di Carlo Costamgna, 18 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 267, 267–327 (1989). 
 138.  Gino Arias, La Proprietà Privata nel Diritto Fascista, in LO STATO: RIVISTA DI SCIENZE 
GIURIDICHE, ECONOMICHE E SOCIALI, supra note 137, at 332, 333 n.6. 
 139.  Monateri & Somma, supra note 12, at 58 (arguing that “it is widely known that in the 
Nationalist Socliast ideology the group on which the destiny of the individuals depends, has in 
the first place a racial connotation”). However, references to its economic value often prevail and, 
together with them, statements regarding the subordination of the individual needs to the 
requirements of production. And, “in the Fascist literature the intent of supporting economic 
interests, and in particular the necessities of national production, prevails.” Id. at 60. Italian 
authors substantially agree (1) in believing that such circumstances may be ascribed to the 
development of the corporative idea of state and (2) in underlining that it led to exalting themes 
such as enterprise productivity and economic solidarity in the superior interest of the Nation.  
 140.  POLLARD, supra note 127, at 88–90; Tiago Saraiva & M. Norton Wise, 
Autarky/Autarchy: Genetics, Food Production, and the Building of Fascism, 40 HIST. STUD. NAT. 
SCI. 419, 426 (2010). On corporatism and the productivist myth, see Traute Rafalski, Social 
Planning and Corporatism: Modernization Tendencies in Italian Fascism, 18 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 
10, 32–35 (1988). 
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Nation is an organism with life, objectives, and means that are 
superior to those of the individuals who compose it. It is a moral, 
political and economic unity fully realized in the Fascist State.”141 
Fascist property scholars saw no contradiction between 
subordinating individual property rights to the larger interest of the 
Fascist state and the liberal language of autonomy, personhood, and 
labor. Giovanni Gentile, the Italian philosopher who was the 
“ideologue” of the Fascist regime, resolved the contradiction in his 
theory of Italian liberalism, that is, Fascist liberalism.142 Fascist 
liberalism is true liberalism, according to Gentile. While decadent 
classical liberalism sees liberty from the point of view of the 
individual, true liberalism sees it from that of the state. Liberty is the 
supreme end and the norm of every human life, but it realizes itself in 
the common will, not in the individual will. The greatest liberty 
coincides with the greatest strength of the state. The state is an 
ethical entity: not an association between men (inter homines), rather 
an entity that every individual holds in her heart (interiore homine).143 
This ethical state that individuals hold in their hearts motivates them 
to act as statesmen, in the superior interest of the nation.144 
The property scholars who developed the tree concept of 
property worked against this background. Their commitment was 
twofold. At a descriptive level, they sought to draw a more modern 
concept of property, one that would, better than the ownership model, 
account for the changes in the real life of property (i.e., the 
relativization and specialization of property rights discussed above). 
At a normative level, the theorists of the tree concept of property 
sought to resist and to offer an alternative to the theory of “Fascist 
property.” To oppose the narrowly monistic Fascist theory of 
property—monistic in that it foregrounded one single value, the 
productive strength of the Fascist nation—they proposed a theory of 
property grounded in value pluralism. The tree concept of property, I 
 
 141.  CARTA DEL LAVORO art. 1 (1927), available at http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/ 
hcu/docs/t5/art/art8.pdf. 
 142.  See GIOVANNI GENTILE, CHE COSA È IL FASCISMO (1924). For further narration on 
Gentile’s theory of Fascist liberalism, see NORBERTO BOBBIO, IDEOLOGICAL PROFILE OF 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ITALY 127 (1995):  
[T]here were two liberalisms, the atomistic liberalism of Enlightenment origins, and 
the Italian (or German) variety, in which “liberty is indeed the supreme end and the 
norm of every human life, but in so far as individual and social education realizes it, 
kindling in the individual the common will that is manifested as law, and therefore as 
state.” This Italian liberalism was the same thing as fascism, “which sees no other 
individual subject of liberty than the person who feels pulsing in his own heart the 
superior interest of the community and the sovereign will of the State.” 
 143.  BOBBIO, supra note 142, at 128. 
 144.  Id.  
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will argue below, serves a fundamental commitment to individual 
owners’ autonomous control, as well as to a plurality of public values, 
such as equitable access to resources, productive efficiency, and 
participatory management of resources. 
Although the theorists of the tree concept of property had 
insights in many ways similar to those of the American realists, they 
worked in parochial isolation, largely ignoring the work done by their 
Anglo-American colleagues. Actually, the only American who appears 
in their footnotes is probably, today, the least well known of the 
analytical jurists, Henry Terry.145 Also, unlike the American realists, 
they were perceived neither as methodological heretics nor as political 
radicals. Methodologically, the scholars who developed the tree model 
of property were influenced by the Juristes Inquiets,146 a group of late 
nineteenth-century French jurists who had developed a sociological 
approach to legal analysis but were also steeped in traditional 
European conceptualism. For instance, Salvatore Pugliatti, the jurist 
to whom we owe the image of property as a tree, described his 
approach to property as an effort to reconcile conceptualism and 
sociological jurisprudence. More than any other legal institution, 
property reflects social reality, Pugliatti wrote.147 Nevertheless, 
property scholars cannot do away with abstract schemes. Therefore, 
Pugliatti concluded, property scholarship oscillates between the two 
opposite poles of conceptual order and experience of real life.148 
As to their ideological and political leanings, the theorists of 
the tree model were very diverse. They were liberals, but with 
 
 145.  MARIO ROTONDI, L’ABUSO DI DIRITTO 82 (1923). 
 146.  Marie-Claire Belleau, Les “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early 
Twentieth Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379. As to their methodological beliefs, the 
Juristes Inquiets believed in a blend of antiformalism, historical/sociological insights, and 
progressive political beliefs. Their antiformalism did not go as far as rejecting the very idea of a 
system of private law concepts. They retained the vocabulary of the system, but they showed the 
existence of gaps and contradictions in the system. As pioneers of a historical/sociological 
approach to law, they were interested in the social and historical fabric of law, and they sought 
to make the system more reflective of the actual fabric of law. Collective landownership had 
shown extraordinary social and historical vitality. A social and historical fact in need of 
conceptual systematization, collective property seemed to these innovative jurists the ideal object 
of investigation. For further information on the Italians, see PAOLO GROSSI, SCIENZA GIURIDICA 
ITALIANA: UN PROFILO STORICO 1860-1950, at ch. I (2000) (calling them “Heretics”). For further 
information on the Germans and in particular on the coexistence of the formalist idea of system 
with the historical/sociological approach, see Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German 
Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837, 859–73 (1990). For further information on the politics of the 
Juristes Inquiets and their commitment to a moderately redistributive agenda, see Amr 
Shalakany, Between Identity and Redistribution: Sanhuri, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise, 8 
ISLAMIC LAW & SOC’Y 201, 214–17 (2001). 
 147.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 147–48. 
 148.  Id. at 148. 
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different backgrounds. Some were classical liberals with an interest in 
natural law. Others were influenced by Benedetto Croce’s liberalism, a 
liberalism embedded in an idealist and historicist philosophy. Still 
others were social Catholics or had Socialist leanings.149 As to their 
relationship to Fascism, they were anti-Fascist but never formally 
disassociated from the Fascist regime. They were part of the unheroic 
majority, the large group of intellectuals who did not support the 
regime and privately expressed condemnation, but never openly 
disassociated from it.150 
 
 149.  Lodovico Barassi (1873-1961) was a professor at the universities of Perugia, Genova, 
and Bari and at the Catholic University in Milan. Barassi was a classical liberal. See GROSSI, 
supra note 146, at 59–60 (describing Barassi as “openly annoyed by the general intellectual 
climate that marginalized the individual to foreground ‘the social’ and hostile to any excessive 
intrusion of state regulation but fully aware of the complexity of modern social life”). Salvatore 
Pugliatti (1903-1976) was a professor at the University of Messina, dean of the law faculty, and 
“Rettore” of the university (1957-1975). Pugliatti was an eclectic intellectual: a jurist, a literary 
critic, and a scholar in the history and criticism of music. An extremely prolific legal scholar, 
Pugliatti also published two essays on the interpretation of music: “L’Interpretazione Musicale,” 
in 1940, and “Canti primitivi,” in 1942. Culturally deeply rooted in his native Sicily, he was part 
of the Sicilian literary avant-garde and a lifelong friend and soulmate of poet Salvatore 
Quasimodo. Pugliatti was a Social Democrat, secular but with an interest in Catholic thought 
reflected in the many letters he exchanged with Giorgio La Pira, one of the most prominent 
figures in the Christian Democratic Party. For a further information on Pugliatti, see LUIGI 
FERLAZZO NATOLI, NEL SEGNO DEL DESTINO, VITA DI SALVATORE PUGLIATTI (2007); GIORGIO LA 
PIRA, LETTERE A SALVATORE PUGLIATTI (1920-1939) (1980). Widar Cesarini-Sforza (1886-1965) 
was a Catholic and philosophically committed to Italian idealism. As a Catholic, Cesarini-Sforza 
was close to the intellectual/ideological movement known as modernism (an attempt to provide a 
new reading of the texts of Christianity, more consonant with modern industrial society), a 
movement which was firmly condemned by the Vatican orthodoxy, in particular by Pius X’s 
encyclical Pascendi (1907). Methodologically eclectic, Cesarini-Sforza applied to law the insights 
of religious modernism, thereby insisting on the need for a functional and nontextualist 
interpretation of legal texts. See GROSSI, supra note 146, at 102–03; Pietro Costa, Widar 
Cesarini-Sforza, Illusioni e Certezze della Giurisprudenza, in 5-6 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA 
STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 1031 (1976-77). Francesco Ferrara (1877-1941) was 
one of the most prominent and prolific jurists of the first half of the twentieth century, a 
professor at the University of Pisa and later of Naples, a classical liberal and, methodologically, a 
solid conceptualist. For further information on Ferrara, see GROSSI, supra note 146, at 76–79, 
130–34. Filippo Vassalli (1855-1955) was a professor in the universities of Perugia, Camerino, 
Genova, and Torino and dean of the law faculty at Rome’s La Sapienza University. Vassalli was 
the coordinator of the commission that drafted the Italian Civil Code of 1942. For further 
information on Vassalli, see G.B. FERRI, FILIPPO VASSALLI, O IL DIRITTO CIVILE COME OPERA 
D’ARTE (2002). 
 150.  Salvatore Pugliatti maintained an ambiguous relationship to the Fascist regime. A 
critic of the regime, he maintained formal relations of affiliation and collaboration with the GUF, 
the Fascist association of university students and faculty. This formal affiliation allowed him to 
launch a number of cultural projects, including the experimental theatre project known as Teatro 
Sperimentale di Messina. His anti-Fascist sentiments are reflected in several anecdotes. Luigi 
Ferlazzo Natoli in his biography of Pugliatti tells that once Pugliatti showed up at a public event 
of the GUF with a white shirt rather than the black Fascist uniform. Ferlazzo Natoli also wrote 
that Pugliatti had been denounced as anti-Fascist, and the Fascist regime put him under 
surveillance. One day an employee of the postal office showed up at Pugliatti’s home and handed 
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The uneasy tension between conceptualism and sociological 
insights, individualism and social impulses, and continuity and 
change that underlies the tree concept of property is the result of the 
effort to negotiate this complex set of events and influences. 
B. The Tree Concept of Property 
1. Property Comprises Analytically Distinct Entitlements 
The first step in the design of the tree concept of property was 
to dissect property into its constitutive elements (i.e., the different 
sticks in the bundle.) The European theorists of the tree concept of 
property did not talk of a bundle or sticks, but like the realists, they 
recognized that property is a set of distinct entitlements that the 
government may reshape for regulatory or redistributive purposes. In 
the first chapter of his book “La proprieta’ nel nuovo diritto,” Salvatore 
Pugliatti acknowledged that, “although we tend to think of property in 
unitary terms, as one right, in fact, property, as any other right, 
comprises different entitlements.” It is neither easy nor possible to list 
all the entitlements, Pugliatti noted, but two clusters of entitlements 
need special mention: the right to use and the right to transfer.151 
Both can be broken down further, into more specific entitlements. 
Along similar lines, Ludovico Barassi, another of the craftsmen of the 
new property, noted that jurists used to think of property as an 
unlimited right.152 “We have now concluded,” Barassi continued, “that 
the content of property consists in a variety of specific entitlements, 
an exhaustive enumeration of which is not possible.”153 
This was hardly a new insight. Since Roman law, civil law 
jurists had recognized that property consists of distinct entitlements, 
 
him a letter. The letter was addressed to the Fascist authorities and was yet another 
denunciation of Pugliatti’s anti-Fascism. It asked that Pugliatti be placed under a confinement 
regime in one the Fascist confinement locations. The postal employee had seen the content of the 
letter and took it out of the mailbag to protect Pugliatti. See FERLAZZO NATOLI, supra note 149, 
at 62, 69. Cesarini-Sforza’s relationship with Fascism was even more ambiguous. See Costa, 
supra note 149, at 1034 n.11. Historians of legal thought disagree on the role played by this 
unheroic majority. The conventional story is that this majority of liberals who kept their 
academic jobs and resisted from within, continuing their work as scholars and teachers, 
prevented the penetration of Fascist ideas into law and hence shielded the legal system from 
Fascism. More recently, others have cast doubt on this narrative, suggesting that this ample 
circle of intellectuals who did not openly dissociate from the regime made the totalitarian 
perversion possible. See Monateri & Somma, supra note 12, at 56. 
 151.  Salvatore Pugliatti, Strumenti Tecnico-Giuridici per la Tutela dell’Interesse Pubblico 
nella Proprietà, in LA CONCEZIONE FASCISTA DELLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA, supra note 113, at 161. 
 152.  Ludovico Barassi, Il Diritto di Proprietà e la Funzione Sociale, in LA CONCEZIONE 
FASCISTA DELLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA, supra note 113, at 183, 186. 
 153.  Id.  
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and that owners may parcel out some of these entitlements and still 
be owners. Roman dominium, the earliest progenitor of the ownership 
model of property, was the owner’s plenary control over an object 
availing against the world. It was the largest aggregate of 
entitlements. The owner, or dominus, has the ius utendi, fruendi, 
abutendi.154 The ius utendi is the right to make use of the thing to the 
exclusion of all others, the ius fruendi is the right to reap all the 
benefits capable of being legitimately derived from the thing, and the 
ius abutendi involves the right of consumption, destruction, and the 
right to freely dispose of it during her lifetime or at her death. 
Dominium was plenum (full) when all these rights were vested in the 
owner herself. The owner, however, may choose to transfer certain 
rights to another person. For example, she may transfer the right to 
use and to reap the civil and natural fruits of the thing to another 
person called an usufructuary. The dominus remains a dominus even 
though her rights are now restricted and qualified by the usufructus. 
Her dominium does not lose its essential character.155 
What was new was the emphasis on the state’s role in curbing 
or reshaping ownership entitlements. In other words, like the realists, 
the theorists of the tree concept of property called attention to the fact 
that not only the owner can reshape the standard set of property 
entitlements, as civil law jurists had long recognized, but also the 
state may do so. Pugliatti devoted a long essay to the regulatory limits 
to property entitlements.156 Limits to the right to use were not too 
puzzling to civil law jurists. After all, the Code Napoleon clearly said 
that property is the right to use and dispose of things in the most 
absolute way, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by laws 
and regulations. Hence, setback and height requirements, the 
prohibition to erect constructions on certain types of land such as 
forest land, or the need to request authorization to plant certain types 
of crops, were seen as mere conditions for the exercise of the right to 
use. These conditions were justified by the need to coordinate the 
interests of neighboring owners, or to mediate between the interests of 
owners and that of the collectivity.157 By contrast, limits on the right 
to transfer—such as the requirement of previous governmental 
authorization for the transfer of things of historical and artistic 
interest or the requisition of aircrafts or horses in time of war—were 
 
 154.  W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW: FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 187–88 
(3d ed., Peter Stein rev. ed. 2007). 
 155.  Id. at 187. 
 156.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 252 (“Interesse pubblico e privato nel diritto di proprieta.”). 
 157.  Id. at 16–22. 
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perceived as more pervasive intrusions on ownership. But, Pugliatti 
warned, they are not. They are similar in nature to limits on use 
rights. They are suspensions of the right to transfer justified by the 
government’s interest in controlling resources that are critical for the 
public interest. The right to transfer property, Pugliatti noted, is not 
an essential element of property.158 State regulation may limit or take 
the right and the property will still be property. 
2. The Trunk of the Property Tree: Autonomous-Control Rights and 
Social Function 
a. The Individualist Element 
Contrary to the realist and many postrealist property analysts, 
the Europeans discussed the owner’s distinct entitlements but never 
lost sight of the overall structure of property. The structure of 
property, Pugliatti wrote, resembles that of a tree with a unitary 
trunk and many branches.159 The trunk is the essence of property, the 
core entitlement or entitlements that are necessary for a right over a 
thing to be property. While Lodovico Barassi vaguely described this 
core as “the owner’s sovereignty,” Pugliatti argued that the core is the 
owner’s right to exclusively control the use of a resource.160 In other 
words, the trunk of the property tree is the owner’s right to have the 
exclusive ultimate control over how and by whom the thing will be 
used. Pugliatti insisted that the trunk of property is use-control rights 
rather than exclusion rights, as in the ownership model of property. 
Through the institution of property, Pugliatti wrote, the legal system 
protects an owner’s interest in using the resource and the full range of 
possible alternative uses a resource may be put to.161 Exclusion follows 
logically from use. It is from the importance of an owner’s interest in 
using a resource and from the scope of the legal protection this 
 
 158.  Id. at 22–23. 
 159.  Id. at 149. 
 160.  Id. at 159:  
[P]roperty is general control . . . through the concept of property law protects the 
owner’s interest in the full use of the thing . . . from the generality and the extension 
of the protection accorded to the owner as well as from the nature of this protection 
[i.e., against the world, erga omnes] we deduce the exclusivity that characterizes 
property rights.  
Id. at 149 (“[I]t has been noted that his multiplicity of aspects does not compromise the 
conceptual unity of property.”); id. at 302 (“[T]he inner core is the owner’s interest in the full use 
of the thing to the exclusion of anyone else.”); Barassi, supra note 152, at 186. 
 161.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 159. 
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interest is afforded, Pugliatti continued, that we deduce exclusion 
rights.162 
The trunk of the property tree was important for two reasons, a 
conceptual and a normative reason. Conceptually, identifying the 
trunk of property was necessary to distinguish property from other 
rights as well as to render the very concept of rights in rem 
meaningful. First, the owner’s ultimate control over the use of the 
resource distinguishes property from usufructus or emphiteusis. In 
usufructus, the right holder has use rights but not the right to choose 
a new or different economic use of the thing. In emphiteusis, the right 
holder’s ample control over the use of land is virtually 
indistinguishable from that of an owner. That has generated 
disagreement among property scholars over the nature of emphiteusis, 
leading some to consider it a form of substantive property rather than 
one of the minor real rights.163 Also, identifying the core entitlements 
made the category rights in rem as rights against the world at large 
practically meaningful. It clarified the owner’s entitlements that the 
world at large has an obligation to respect. 
More importantly, identifying the essence of property was 
crucial from a normative perspective. The owner’s core entitlements 
are the entitlements the state can limit or reshape only for extremely 
weighty social goals. They define the owner’s sphere of autonomy that 
the state, in this case the Fascist state, cannot invade. This insistence 
on the owner’s sphere of autonomy may seem puzzling, coming from 
jurists who were interested in designing a concept of property that 
would account for, and validate the fact that, in modern society, 
property is regulated for a variety of social purposes. The urgent need 
to propose an alternative to the Fascist theory of property and its 
shrinking of the owner’s sphere of autonomous control explains the 
insistence on autonomy by the theorists of the tree concept. At the core 
of property, Barassi insisted, is the sovereign autonomy of the 
individual owner.164 The words “sovereignty” and “autonomy” are 
endlessly repeated in Barassi’s essay. “In times of fascist rule,” 
Barassi continued, “we need not be afraid of words.”165 Barassi’s quote 
and his repeated use of the word “autonomy” illustrate the liberals’ 
fear that Fascist property theorists would expel the very word 
“autonomy” from property debates. 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 240–45. 
 164.  Barassi, supra note 152, at 189. 
 165.  Id. at 187. 
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b. The Social Element 
The theorists of the tree concept realized that, to provide a good 
alternative to Fascist property, protecting the owner’s sphere of 
autonomous control was not enough. A modern liberal concept of 
property is one that acknowledges and foregrounds the social 
dimension of property. The rise of Fascism, they realized, was the 
consequence of the crisis of liberalism. It was the consequence of 
liberals’ insensibility to new ideas about the proper balance between 
individual rights and the interest of the collectivity. The jurists and 
intellectuals supporting the Fascist regime could easily argue that 
liberals were still under the spell of decadent enlightenment 
individualism and had proved unable to fully adapt the social, 
economic, and legal institutions of liberal Italy to the new needs of 
modern interdependent society.166 By contrast, Fascist property 
scholars argued, Fascist property, fully malleable to reflect the public 
interest of the Fascist state, accounted for the socialization of property 
in modern society. 
The challenge for the theorists of the tree concept was to find a 
new equilibrium between the individual and the social element in 
property. The new tree concept of property had to be both liberal and 
social.167 The tree-concept jurists’ solution was to argue that owners 
should exercise their use-control entitlements, while remaining 
mindful of property’s social function. The social function of property is 
part of the trunk of the tree.168 Property had always included social 
elements. “At no point in history, not even in Roman law,” Barassi 
suggested, “was property absolute.” “The idea of a social interest, 
parallel to the interest of the individual owner,” he continued, “has 
always been there.”169 Similarly, Widar Cesarini-Sforza noted that, 
while the ownership concept was a product of the French Revolution, 
and its abstract individualism was an overreaction to the status-based 
restraints the Ancien Regime imposed on owners, “not even the 
revolutionaries of 1789 could ignore that ownership of land is 
 
 166.  See BOBBIO, supra note 142, at 129–30 (describing a speech by Alfredo Rocco that 
characterized the liberal state as “imported paradise” while the Fascist state “was a product of 
Italic genius ‘that realizes to the maximum the power and coherence of the juridical organization 
of society’ ”); POLLARD, supra note at 127, at 1–19 (chronicling the rise of the “pre-history” of 
Italian Fascism and describing the failures of the liberal state that advanced the Fascist cause). 
 167.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 1–5; Josserand, supra note 114, at 104. 
 168.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 281 (starting his discussion on the social function of 
property by saying that “the core of property is now open to transformations”). 
 169.  Barassi, supra note 152, at 195. 
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premised on a fundamental obligation to cultivate it and make it 
productive.”170 
For others, the tree concept of property stood in ideal 
continuity with the civic ethos of the Italian Risorgimento, the 
political and ideological movement that led to the country’s political 
unification in 1861. Barassi elaborated at length on this new civic 
property. In classical-liberal ownership, Barassi wrote, the interest of 
the individual owner trumped the interest of the collectivity. In 
Fascist property, the interest of the Fascist state trumped the interest 
of the individual owner.171 By contrast, the new tree property 
envisions the individual owner immersed in society. The owner’s 
dominion is a civic dominion qualified by social obligations.172 
The social function of property was by no means a new idea. It 
had been around for decades. It was introduced at the beginning of the 
twentieth century by Leon Duguit. Duguit argued that, in a modern 
industrial society, property is no longer a subjective right; rather, it is 
the social function of the owner of wealth.173 Duguit pointed to some 
examples of the social function in French case law (cases prohibiting 
owners from excavating without reason, and erecting spite fences or 
fake chimneys) as well as in legislation (legislation requiring the 
running and maintenance of electric service without payment). 
The problem with the notion of social function was that it was 
hopelessly indeterminate. Its content and the precise extent of the 
duties it imposed on owners were highly contested. The social function 
of property, Barassi noted, is a beautiful formula when you reason in 
abstract philosophical or political terms. But it provides little guidance 
to lawyers and judges who have to deal with actual specific facts, and 
not with general problems. For Duguit, the social function was a basic 
obligation not to harm others. This meant little more than the old 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. Fascist property scholars 
had also appropriated the social function formula. For the Fascists, 
the social function of property meant the superior interest of the 
 
 170.  Widar Cesarini-Sforza, Proprietà e Impresa, in LA CONCEZIONE FASCISTA DELLA 
PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA, supra note 113, at 361, 365. 
 171.  Barassi, supra note 152, at 194.  
 172.  Id. 
 173.  LEON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GENERALES DU DROIT PRIVE DEPUIS LE CODE 
NAPOLEON 21 (2d. ed. 1920); see also M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: 
Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 192–93 (2010) (exploring “the origins of 
Duguit’s thought on [the social-obligation norm] as some necessary background work to the 
current debate concerning the social function of property”); Symposium, The Social Function of 
Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1004–08 (2011) (citing Duguit’s 
work as one of the more influential alternative concepts of property, and explaining Duguit’s 
view that “the state should protect property only when it fulfills its social function”). 
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Fascist state. As noted earlier, in Italian Fascism, the interest of the 
state was largely identified with the productivity of the national 
economy. 
The tree-concept theorists’ important contribution is that they 
envisioned the content of the social function in pluralistic terms. 
Earlier writers had been hopelessly evasive about the meaning and 
content of the social element of property. The Fascist property 
theorists had been more specific about the content of the social 
function of property. For them social function meant the productive 
needs of the Fascist nation. This was, in contemporary property theory 
language, a monistic definition, one that focuses on one value. By 
contrast, the tree-concept theorists argued that social function alludes 
to the multiple values and interests implicated by different resources. 
This pluralism was captured in the image of the branches of the 
property tree. The branches of the property tree are many resource-
specific agglomerates of entitlements: agrarian property, family 
property, affordable urban residential property, entrepreneurial 
property, and intellectual property. The content of the social function 
of property is different for each of the branches. 
3. The Branches of the Property Tree 
Property law had long treated certain resources as special. For 
example, water law was a distinct subfield of Roman property law 
with rules reflecting the “fugitive” nature of water. The theorists of 
the tree model of property used this resource-specific analytical lens 
as their entry point to property analysis.174 
Louis Josserand was the first to talk of multiple resource-
specific properties. In the twentieth century, Josserand argued that 
property is not only quantitatively different, in that owners’ 
entitlements are variously limited, it is also qualitatively diverse. 
“Because of the differences in its object,” Josserand argued, “property 
takes on different shapes depending on the type of resource involved. 
Property is no longer uniform, rather it is multiform, infinitely diverse 
 
 174.  While Pugliatti uses the image of the tree, common in the property literature of the 
time is the slogan, “one property, many properties.” The slogan was invented later, in the 1930s 
by Filippo Vassalli, who translated and popularized a passage from Josserand: “[P]roperty is no 
longer uniform, rather it is multiform, infinitely diverse and varied; there is no longer one 
property but many properties with different specialized regimes.” Josserand, supra note 114, at 
101. Pugliatti rejects what we would call today the full disintegration of property pursued by 
Filippo Vassalli. Vassalli dissolved property into different property regimes regulating different 
resources. Vassalli, supra note 122, at 103–04; see also Pietro Rescigno, Disciplina dei beni e 
Situazione Della Persona, 5-6 QUADERNI FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO 
MODERNO 861 (1976-77) (explaining this resource-specific approach). 
3b. di Robilant_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2013 7:48 AM 
910 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3:869 
and varied. There is no longer one property but many properties 
subject each with its own specialized regime.”175 Along similar lines, 
Filippo Vassalli noted that “the entitlements granted to owners as 
well as the legal regime of property vary depending on the resource 
owned.” To accurately describe the real life of property, Vassalli 
continued, “we have to recognize that there is no longer one property, 
rather there are many properties. This is because the public interest 
demands that different resources be regulated differently to reflect the 
different policy objectives specific to different resources.”176 
The focus on the resource, the thing owned, is an important 
difference between the tree concept and the bundle of rights concept. 
The jurists who developed the tree model of property were not 
oblivious to the Hohfeldian intuition that property is a set of relations 
among persons, but they never lost sight of the thingness of property. 
For example, Lorenzo Mossa was ready to admit that “the idea of 
property as the individual’s absolute right over a thing is 
misleading . . . because property is not a right over a thing.”177 For 
Mossa, property has an in personam aspect alongside its in rem 
nature. It necessarily involves a relationship between its active and 
passive subjects; property rights entail correspondent duties on 
others. But, Mossa continued, recognition of this in personam aspect 
should not lead us to conflate in rem rights and in personam rights.178 
However, in the tree model of property, this focus on the thing 
did not mean a return to a pure conceptualist analysis concerned with 
categories and bright lines. Rather, it triggered a shift toward 
normative analysis. Crafting multiple resource-specific properties 
required that property lawyers discuss the peculiar characteristics of 
different resources, and the plural values as well as the individual and 
social interests they implicate. In a Europe threatened by totalitarian 
rule, this resource-specific approach helped liberal jurists achieve two 
important goals. 
First, it emphasized the value of pluralism in property law. In 
times where property debates were becoming increasingly focused on 
the productive efficiency of the Fascist nation, the theorists of the tree 
concept of property believed in the value of pluralism. In their 
discussion of the different branches of the property tree, they focused 
 
 175.  Josserand, supra note 114, at 100. 
 176.  Vassalli, supra note 122, at 103. 
 177.  Lorenzo Mossa, Trasformazione Dogmatica e Positiva Della Proprietà Privata, in LA 
CONCEZIONE FASCISTA DELLA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA, supra note 113, at 249, 253–54. 
 178.  Id. at 254–55.  
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on individual owners’ privacy and freedom of action, equality in access 
to productive resources, and cooperative management of resources.179 
Second, the focus on resources allowed our jurists to deal with 
the fundamental problem of the value of pluralism in property law. 
The plural values and interests property law should promote are often 
in conflict with each other, and lawmakers will be called upon to make 
difficult choices. In Fascist times, liberal property law scholars 
worried about the arbitrariness of these choices that may potentially 
lead to a virtual abrogation of individual property rights. By 
grounding values and interests in the context of specific resources, 
they sought to guide and constrain lawmakers’ normative reasoning. 
The actual characteristics of different resources narrow the 
scope of lawmakers’ normative choices, suggesting what values and 
interests are particularly relevant for specific resources and what 
trade-offs are required. Freedom of action or privacy, equitable 
distribution, efficiency, and participatory management have different 
weight depending on whether the resource owned is an irrigation 
canal, a home, a parcel of agricultural land, or a manufacturing firm. 
In weighing the conflicting values and interests, the tree-
concept theorists suggested, lawmakers will look at how different 
resources have been treated and discussed historically as well as in 
past and present legislation. Historical and legislative materials are 
repositories of ideas about how to regulate different resources. 
“Property, more than any other legal institution,” Pugliatti noted, 
“reflects, in its structure and shape, the social and historical 
environment.”180 Pugliatti urged the inversion of the century-long 
tendency to define property in absolute detachment from history and 
reality. To fully understand the problems of the many properties, 
property scholars need the help of history; they need to view the 
history of property against the background of the larger history of 
society.181 They also need to turn their attention away from the Civil 
Code and take a close look at the myriad of piecemeal laws and 
regulations that define the shape of the various properties. 
In their writings, the tree-concept theorists produced detailed 
maps of how resource-specific legislation had, over the last four 
decades, limited and qualified ownership of mines, water, forest land, 
agricultural land, means of transportation, utilities, etc. For the tree 
concept’s liberal advocates, analysis of the concrete characteristics of 
 
 179.  See, e.g., PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 262–81 (offering a discussion of agrarian 
property). 
 180.  Id. at 147. 
 181.  Id.  
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resources, and fidelity to the historical and present legal framework 
for specific resources, was the way to reduce the arbitrary nature of 
normative reasoning in property law and to stem the Fascist regime’s 
potential erosion of property rights in the name of a generic and 
unspecified interest of the Fascist state. 
The two branches of the property tree that received special 
attention were agrarian property and enterprise ownership 
(l’impresa). The tree concept also accommodated what was then 
emerging as a new branch, the law of affordable housing. 
a. Agrarian Property 
Land had hardly ever been analyzed from a resource-specific 
perspective.182 Land was synonymous with real property and little 
differentiation was made.183 Josserand and Pugliatti approached 
different types of land as different resources. They devoted particular 
attention to agricultural land. They believed that the changing social 
and economic conditions of the early twentieth century called for a 
new legal regime for agricultural land. The limited availability of good 
quality land, the migration to urban areas triggered by the 
development of industry and the services sector, and the shift to 
intensive and technologically advanced cultivation systems required 
property rules that would properly protect the public interests 
involved.184 In particular, in Pugliatti’s analysis, agricultural land 
requires dovetailing two public interests: productive efficiency and 
more equal access to the means of production.185 For Pugliatti, 
“ownership of land as a productive resource involves the individual’s 
 
 182.  For a contemporary resource-specific approach to landownership, see Eduardo M. 
Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 821 (2009) (arguing that the “complexity of 
land—its intrinsic complexity, but even more importantly the complex ways in which human 
beings interact with it—undermines the positive claim that owners will focus on a single value, 
such as market value, in making decisions about their land”). 
 183.  Josserand, supra note 114, at 102–03: 
[E]ven if we limit our investigation to real property, we find that, within this genre 
there are multiple species. Agricultural land is treated differently than urban real 
estate. In France a rural code is being drafted that contains all the rules regulating 
agricultural life and in most countries, most notably in Italy, an agrarian law is 
developing; a prominent legal innovation that is attracting the attention of lawmakers 
and law professors, in universities as well as in the official palaces. And other special 
regimes have developed within real property, family property has its own regime and 
so does low income housing. 
 184.  For a later description of these developments, as well as of the idea that agricultural 
land is a highly significant resource that needs special property rules, see Francesco Santoro-
Passarelli, Proprieta, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL NOVECENTO § 6 (1980), available at 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/proprieta_(Enciclopedia-Novecento)/. 
 185.  PUGLIATTI, supra note 8, at 263. 
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entrepreneurship and his responsibility.” When land is at stake, 
Pugliatti continued, “the economic interest of the individual blends 
with the interest of society and generates ethical and social impulses 
that end up shaping legal norms.”186 Making land available to all, 
Pugliatti wrote, “is a social goal. The generalization and expansion of 
access to property, not as an abstract legal concept, but as a concrete 
economic reality, is a crucial step toward the realization of the 
principle of the equal social dignity of all.”187 Pugliatti was interested 
in disaggregating and recombining the aggregate of entitlements 
pertaining to agricultural land to achieve the twin goals of 
productivity and egalitarian redistribution. 
Pugliatti’s ideas influenced the Italian legislature. The Italian 
provisional legislative decree number 89 of 1946 is an example of how 
this new resource-specific analysis of property entitlements had 
practical influence.188 The new approach provided the legislature with 
an analytical framework that helped to reshape the bundle of rights 
pertaining to agricultural land for efficiency and redistributive 
purposes. The decree was supported by the Christian Democratic 
 
 186.  Id. at 263–64. 
 187.  Id. at 277. 
 188.  Id. at 267–70. The decree number 89 was at the center of a political struggle between 
the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, a struggle that happened against the 
background of the debate over the 1947 Republican Constitution. Through the decree, both the 
Christian Democrats and the Communists wanted to make a larger point about what type of 
protection property should be afforded in the new constitution. To make things more difficult, 
this happened at a moment of violent social unrest in the southern Calabria region. An earlier 
version of the decree had been passed with the support of the Communist Minister of 
Agriculture, Fausto Gullo. It provided that cooperatives of landless peasants or labor unions 
could apply to obtain in concession lands left idle or not productively cultivated. The decision on 
the concession would be made by a commission presided over by the prefect and including a 
representative of landowners and of the cooperatives. In the months before the decree, the 
military section of the Communist Party had organized the occupation of four thousand hectares 
of land in the Calabria region. The decree was seen by the moderate part of the Communist 
Party as a way to enlist the rural proletariat, traditionally more inclined to anarchist ideas, and 
to channel their action into the sphere of legality. It was also seen as a way to bring about the 
“revolution” that had never happened. The Risorgimento movement that led to the unification of 
the country was seen as a process that had been interrupted by the Fascist regime, a missed 
opportunity for a more radical social revolution. After the fall of the Fascist regime, it was the 
moment to complete the “interrupted” revolutionary process. It was also seen as a way to signal 
that the protection of private property in the new constitution should be limited, and that 
property should be qualified with some reference to a social function in the sense of a more equal 
distribution. The second version, the decree number 89 of 1946 discussed by Pugliatti, was 
supported by the Christian Democratic Minister of Agriculture Segni. The Christian Democrats 
were also interested in enlisting the rural landless peasantry. They organized “white” Catholic 
cooperatives that competed with the “red” Communist cooperatives. The Christian Democrats 
also wanted to make a point about property in the new constitution: protection of private 
property should be limited and qualified by the general interest. See generally EMANUELE 
BERNARDI, LA RIFORMA AGRARIA IN ITALIA E GLI STATI UNITI (2006). 
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minister for agriculture as a response to the peasants’ demand for 
land in the South. According to the decree, cooperatives of agricultural 
workers could apply to obtain, in concession from the local 
government, privately owned parcels of land left either idle or not 
productively cultivated by their owners. In other words, failure to 
cultivate resulted in the owner losing the right to use, which was 
transferred to a cooperative of landless workers. The owner retained 
formal title, the right to transfer the formal title, and part of the 
income rights (i.e., the right to receive an annual rent). The right to 
use was split between the cooperative and the local government. The 
cooperative had the right to cultivate the land, a duty to improve the 
production, and the right to appropriate the product of the land. The 
local government also had the right to supervise the cooperative’s use 
and management. Legislative decree number 89 was a short-lived 
experiment in land collectivization, though. It was a provisional 
legislative decree subject to yearly renewal. It was eventually dropped 
in 1950, when the new Republican Constitution of 1948 and a 
legislative proposal for land reform eased the social tensions in the 
South.189 In the new Constitution the public interests implicated by 
ownership of agricultural land had special prominence. Article 44 of 
the Constitution declared that legislation may set conditions on 
ownership of agricultural land, impose limits on the size of 
landholdings, promote land reclamation, and protect small owners.190 
The special social and economic relevance of agricultural land 
as a means of production also required special rules protecting 
agricultural tenants. Starting in the mid-twentieth century, legislative 
concern for the power asymmetry between agricultural landlords and 
tenants translated into a gradual but sweeping reform of agricultural 
leases.191 Mezzadria, a form of land tenure where the tenant pays rent 
in kind in the measure of approximately half of the annual output, 
was seen with particular disfavor by policymakers. The law 756 of 
1964 de facto abolished mezzadria, prohibiting the parties from 
entering into new contracts and converting existing contracts into 
agricultural leases with money rent.192 
 
 189.  See Lorenzo M. Belotti, An Analysis of the Italian Agrarian Reform, 36 LAND ECON. 
118, 118 (1960) (discussing Italian land reform of the late 1940s and early 1950s). 
 190.  Art. 44 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 191.  See Santoro-Passarelli, supra note 184, at 26. 
 192.  For more information on Legge 756 of 1964 and its implementation, see COMMENTARIO 
AL CODICE CIVILE ARTT. 2135-2246, at 80–81 (Paolo Cendon ed., 2009).  
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b. L’impresa (Enterprise Ownership) 
Enterprise ownership (l’impresa) was the other branch of the 
tree that attracted the tree-concept theorists’ interest.193 In mid-
twentieth-century Italy, worker-owned firms predominated in the 
service industry and agriculture and, hence, were the major focus of 
our jurists’ analysis. L’impresa is the ensemble of physical things (the 
plant, machinery, etc.), and the incorporeal rights (leases, contractual 
rights, patents, trademarks, etc.), that are the means for the 
entrepreneur’s productive activity.  
L’impresa presents two important features. First, it is active 
property.194 By active property, the theorists of the tree concept meant 
that the physical things and incorporeal property rights that make up 
l’impresa have their gravitational center in the person and the labor of 
the entrepreneur. In other words, l’impresa is both physical and 
incorporeal property, organized and managed by the entrepreneur for 
a productive purpose. This active dimension of enterprise ownership 
(i.e., the fact that property is functional to a productive process that 
involves management and labor) calls for special rules. For example, 
effective organization of the productive process requires that l’impresa 
be, to some degree, independent from the owner or entrepreneur. 
Accordingly, in case of death or incapacity of the owner or 
entrepreneur, certain management acts, such as contractual offers or 
the granting of a mandate to a representative, survive the person of 
the entrepreneur. 195 
Second, l’impresa has an important public dimension. It is a 
means to an end—production—that involves public interests. The 
entrepreneur is both owner and entrepreneur, but her property rights, 
Professor Widar Cesarini-Sforza warned, are secondary.196 She is first 
an entrepreneur and only secondarily an owner. In the productive 
process, Cesarini-Sforza continued, property acquires a social 
connotation: the individualistic attributes of property are limited to 
reflect the social relevance and the larger public interests involved in 
production. The social importance of entrepreneurial property justifies 
regulation in the public interest. A decade later, the public interests 
involved in enterprise ownership would be clearly stated in the new 
Republican Constitution. The public interests listed in Article 41 of 
 
 193.  On l’impresa as a central theme of property law debates in the 1930s–1950s, see 
GROSSI, supra note 146, at 190–91. See also Alberto Asquini, Il Diritto Commerciale Nel Sistema 
Della Nuova Codificazione, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE (1941). 
 194.  Santoro-Passarelli, supra note 184, at 24. 
 195.  Id. at 25. 
 196.  Cesarini-Sforza, supra note 170, at 371–72. 
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the 1948 Constitution include protecting workers’ dignity and 
ensuring coordination between private entrepreneurial activity and 
the government’ s economic policy.197 
While worker-owned enterprises were the main focus of 
property scholars’ analysis, scholars also discussed investor-owned 
firms. At approximately the same time in the United States as 
scholars A. A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means discussed the problem of 
corporate property,198 the European theorists of the new property also 
offered similar insights. They warned that the central characteristic of 
the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. 
Corporate managers and owners do not have the same incentives, so 
the traditional assumption that the quest for profits will spur the 
owner of industrial property to its effective use is no longer valid. 
Since self-interest alone is inadequate, the only alternative 
mechanism for assuring that corporations are governed in the public 
interest is government regulation. 
c. Affordable Housing 
Affordable housing is another branch of the property tree. This 
branch was not yet the object of academic lawyers’ scholarly work in 
the early years of the twentieth century, but it was at the center of 
economic policy and urban-development debates.199 In the first half of 
the twentieth century, industrialization had triggered a massive 
migration from rural areas to industrial cities resulting in a dramatic 
increase in the demand for low-cost housing. The first response to the 
housing crisis was the Luzzatti Law of 1903, named after Luigi 
Luzzatti, the constitutional law professor and member of Parliament 
who drafted the bill. In his political and academic work, Luzzatti had 
 
 197.  Art. 41 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
 198.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 342, 346–50 (highlighting arguments made by Berle 
and Means in the United States that traditional property theories cannot apply to modern 
corporations and that “[c]orporate power should not be exercised for the exclusive benefit of the 
shareholders but for the benefit of society as a whole”). 
 199.  Academic lawyers began writing about affordable housing only much later in the 1970s. 
See UMBERTO BRECCIA, IL DIRITTO DELL’ABITAZIONE 1–17 (1980) (one of the first comprehensive 
expositions of housing law); Temistocle Martines, Il Diritto alla Casa, in TECNICHE GIURIDICHE E 
SVILUPPO DELLA PERSONA UMANA 392 (N. Lipari ed., 1974) (discussing the legal and normative 
questions posed by the then emerging notion of a right to housing); Domenico Sorace, A Proposito 
di “Proprietà dell’Abitazione,” “Diritto d’Abitazione,” e “Proprietà (Civilistica) della Casa,” 31 
RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 1175 (1977) (discussing housing law that 
focuses on property rules).  
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focused on various aspects of the social question, that is, the problem 
of the living and working conditions of the working classes.200 
The Luzzatti Law created a hybrid private-and-public 
affordable-housing scheme. It created regional “institutes for 
affordable housing,” public in nature but largely funded by private 
banks and mutual aid cooperatives. The institutes were empowered to 
purchase land and build affordable-housing units. Urban studies 
scholars describe the Luzzatti Law as inspired by nineteenth-century 
paternalism.201 The law created two types of units, case economiche 
and case popolari, catering to two different segments of the lower-
income population. Case economiche were medium- and larger-sized 
units to be sold at a fixed price, with favorable financing to lower-
middle-class buyers, the “bourgeoisie of the future.” Case economiche 
were located in neighborhoods designed according to the principles of 
the garden city movement in the United Kingdom.202 By contrast, case 
popolari were small units (in the Fascist period and in the postwar 
years, a single room, called casa minima) to be leased at a fixed rate to 
“the needy of today.”203 
The Luzzatti Law designed a new property regime combining 
and shaping owners’ entitlements to achieve the goal of expanding 
access to decent housing. Duties were an important aspect of this 
regime. For both types of units, the affordable-housing institute had a 
duty to guarantee minimum standards of habitability, while buyers or 
tenants had a duty to maintain the unit in good repair.204 For the case 
economiche, owners’ use rights were limited. Buyers could not make 
improvements to the unit, grant easements, or use it as collateral 
without the housing institute’s consent. Transfer rights were also 
limited.205 Buyers of case economiche could lease their units only with 
the prior authorization of the institute.206 The law also limited the 
rent they could charge and prescribed that tenants had to meet 
 
 200.  Luzzatti characterized his approach as “experimentalist” and “historicist.” A recurrent 
theme in his work was the need for a dialogue between the disciplines of economics and ethics. 
Luzzatti was among the founders of the Association for the Progress of Economic Studies in 
Italy, which promoted government regulation of and intervention in the economy. For more 
information on Luzzatti, see Paolo Pecorari & Pierluigi Ballini, Luigi Luzzatti, in 66 DIZIONARIO 
BIOGRAFICO DEGLI ITALIANI (2007), available at http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luigi-luzzatti 
(Dizionario-Biografico).  
 201.  Alfredo Agustoni, Politiche Abitative, Conflitti e Trasformazioni Urbane 2–4 (2008) 
(unpublished conference notes) (on file with author). 
 202.  Id. at 1–2.  
 203.  Id. at 4.  
 204.  Testo Unico 27 febbraio 1908 n.89 art. 1. (It.). 
 205.  Id. art. 8. 
 206.  Id.  
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eligibility requirements. Similarly, tenants of the case popolari could 
not sublet their units without the institute’s authorization.207 Finally, 
the law granted the institute a right of first refusal in case the buyer 
decided to resell the casa economica.208 
While these early affordable-housing projects were largely 
overlooked by academic writers, by the 1970s property scholars were 
discussing affordable homeownership as a separate branch of the 
property tree.209 In 1971, a new housing law (legge sulla casa) further 
modified the property rules pertaining to affordable homeownership. 
First, it made easier and cheaper the government’s exercise of 
eminent domain to take property for affordable-housing projects. The 
new law simplified eminent domain proceedings and based the 
determination of “just compensation” on the agricultural value of the 
land rather than on its (higher) market value.210  
Second, the new housing law sought to attract developers of 
affordable housing by reviving the right of superficies, a property 
interest typical of civil law systems, which allows separate ownership 
of the land and the buildings erected on the land. The new housing 
law allowed local governments to grant public or private nonprofit 
developers of affordable housing the right of superficies (i.e., a right 
similar to ownership but limited in time) over the buildings erected on 
land owned by the local government. Both the new rules of eminent 
domain and the revival of the right of superficies spurred discussion 
by property scholars, making the new branch of the property tree a 
prolific subfield of property scholarship.211 
 
 207.  Id. art. 14. 
 208.  Id. art. 8. 
 209.  See Pietro Rescigno, Disciplina dei Beni e Situazioni dell Persona, 5/6 QUADERNI 
FIORENTINI 861, 873–74 (1976-77) (discussing Pugliatti’s “one property, many properties” notion 
and including housing among the properties); Santoro-Passarelli, supra note 184, at 21 
(explicitly referring to Pugliatti’s idea of “many properties” and including housing in the list). 
 210.  FRANCESCO CARINGELLA, STUDI DI DIRITTO CIVILE: PROPRIETA E DIRITTI REALI 378 
(2007).  
 211.  L. n. 856/1971 art. 35 (It.). For more information on the right of superficies, see Raffaele 
Caterina, I Diritti Reali, in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE DIRETTO 197–222 (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 
2009) (presenting a comprehensive exposition of the right of superficies and explaining how the 
right of superficies became relevant in the context of the housing law of 1971). 
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III. BEYOND THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP MODELS: A 
PLURALISTIC CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
A. The Structure of Property 
The European jurists who developed the tree concept of 
property took the question of the structure of property seriously by 
questioning which entitlements the right of property comprises, and 
which entitlements are essential for property to be property. Their 
tree image outlined a pluralistic concept of property that still has 
great potential in contemporary property debates and resonates with 
recent theories of structural pluralism in property theory. 
Neither the bundle of rights model nor the ownership model 
has dealt with the question of the structure of property satisfactorily. 
The bundle of rights model has, often, translated to what critics call a 
nominalist approach, whereby property is a purely conventional 
concept with no fixed structure.212 Walter Hamilton’s 1937 entry on 
property in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences is often quoted as 
an example of the realists’ nominalism.213 Hamilton wrote that 
property is “nothing more than an euphonious collection of letters 
which serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that 
persons hold in the commonwealth.”214 Similarly, contemporary 
proponents of the bundle of rights concept largely consider the 
question of the structure of property meaningless. Since property is a 
bundle of relations among persons concerning a thing, and since these 
relations are immeasurably variable in different contexts, property 
 
 212.  See Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 102, at 737:  
[Nominalism] views property as a purely conventional concept with no fixed 
meaning—an empty vessel that can be filled by each legal system in accordance with 
its peculiar values and beliefs. On this view the right to exclude is neither a sufficient 
nor necessary condition of property. It may be a feature commonly associated with 
property, but its presence is not essential; it is entirely optional. A legal system can 
label as property anything it wants to.  
The critique of nominalism is shared by property scholars who do not embrace the ownership 
model. See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF 
OWNERSHIP 20 (1994): 
In many circles these days it has become a commonplace to treat the notion of 
ownership with dismissal . . . . The argument for this conclusion proceeds like this: 
once it is noticed that ownership is not a simple legal relation but a wide variety of 
legal relationships, and once it is noticed how immeasurably variable these relations 
can be in different contexts, it ceases to be useful to refer to any one relation as that of 
ownership. 
 213.  Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 102, at 738. 
 214.  Walter Hamilton, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 528 (1937). 
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ceases to be a useful category.215 In particular, because the array of 
entitlements that a property arrangement might be composed of is as 
various and flexible as one created purely by contract, there is merely 
a nominal difference between property and contract-based 
entitlements.216 
But the question of the structure of property is an important 
one. First, historically, the tendency to cluster proprietary 
entitlements in a standard bundle is a perennial one in Western legal 
culture.217 These entitlements bear a family resemblance in that they 
manifest an interest in granting the owner’s control over a resource.218 
Second, from an epistemological perspective, clarity about the 
structure of property is vital to political debates, allowing people to 
meaningfully discuss problems concerning the allocation of 
resources.219 Clarity over the structure of property serves a crucial 
diagnostic purpose. It allows us to describe and diagnose how the law 
distributes wealth and power in contemporary postcapitalist societies. 
 
 215.  For the most well-known (and criticized) version of bundle of rights nominalism, see 
Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 69, 73 (J. R. Pennock & 
J. Chapman eds., 1980) (“[T]he specialists who design and manipulate legal structures of the 
advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the term property at all.”); see also 
id. at 81 (“The substitution of a bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership conception of property has 
the ultimate consequence that property ceases to be an important category in legal and political 
theory.”). For critical discussions of Grey’s nominalism, see CHRISTMAN, supra note 212, at 20; 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 20–24 
(1985); MUNZER, supra note 32, at 31–36; JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
29 (1988); Merrill, Right to Exclude, supra note 102, at 738. 
 216.  Grey, supra note 215, at 73–85; see also CHRISTMAN, supra note 212, at 20–22 (insisting 
that the difference between property rules and liability or inalienability rules is that property 
rules afford a different type of “control”). The point here is whatever the final contours of the 
structure of ownership turn out to be, their being protected primarily by property rules as 
opposed to (primarily) liability rules is based on the real difference in levels of control that 
owners have of their property compared to the control persons have in other areas of their lives 
that are not the object of ownership.  
 217.  Charles Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY, 
supra note 215, at 28, 43–47. Donahue notes that, historically, the tendency to cluster 
proprietary entitlements is a perennial one in Western legal culture; it has little to do with 
“possessive individualism.” Rather, Donahue explains the tendency to identify a core concept of 
property in terms of procedural developments, with the convenience of identifying “an owner” for 
dispute resolution purposes. 
 218.  CHRISTMAN, supra note 212, at 22 (“If one can argue . . . that there is such a family 
resemblance among the prerogatives of ownership and that this manifests a moral interest that 
has a place in political principles and theories, then the full disaggregation view can be 
discarded.”). 
 219.  WALDRON, supra note 215, at 56 (“The idea of ownership, I have maintained, is the idea 
of solving the problem of allocation by assigning each resource to an individual whose decision 
about how the resource is to be used is final.”); see also MUNZER, supra note 32, at 35; WALDRON, 
supra note 215, at 32 (describing the problem of allocation as “the problem of determining 
peacefully and reasonably predictably who is to have access to which resources for what purposes 
and when”); Jeremy Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (1990). 
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Valuable resources are controlled by individuals, or individual-like 
entities, who have the entitlements to use them, to transfer them 
through market transactions, and to retain the income derived from 
their use or transfer. To completely dissolve the concept of property 
would deprive us of a crucial analytical tool for tracking these 
arrangements. 
While the bundle of rights model of property considers the 
question of the structure of property to be meaningless, the ownership 
model’s characterization of the structure of property is too simplistic. 
Ownership has exclusion at its core. But the focus on exclusion misses 
a big part of how property works. A structure built around exclusion 
fails to acknowledge that most cases of trespass arise in complex, 
ongoing interactions among individuals.220 Owners have engaged in ex 
ante transactions concerning particularized uses of property, and 
courts make fine-grained assessments of these use rights. These 
assessments are typical of what Merrill and Smith call a “governance 
strategy,” rather than a simple “exclusion strategy.”221 This has led 
some proponents of the ownership model to focus on use—or better, 
the exclusive authority to decide how a resource will be used—rather 
than on exclusion.222 More generally, property has changed. It is now 
 
 220.  Mossoff, supra note 18, at 260. 
 221.  Id. In particular, see Mossoff’s discussion of State v. Shack, where the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed trespass charges against two aid workers who entered a camp where 
migrant farmworkers employed by a farmer were hosted. The farmer had granted the workers 
access—a license—but then objected to their activity and asked them to leave. A license is a 
common defense in trespass. It is, Mossoff notes, a governance strategy. It requires the court to 
make in personam assessments about the grant of the license, such as the parties’ 
understandings of the license and its scope. Fine-grained assessments of use rights and in 
personam rights are typical of governance strategies. The court looked at the context, at the 
position of the parties, at the social interests involved, and reversed. The recognition that 
property serves human values, that property rights are not absolute, and that migrant 
farmworkers are a weak segment of the population justified giving the workers rights of access. 
Id. at 260–61. 
 222.  Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions, supra note 15, at 210: 
In extremely telescoped form exclusion is a consequence of use and not the other way 
around. If A has a right of access to fish, B has a profit to pick apples, and C retains 
all other general control over and use of a lot of land, a lawyer can predict when each 
may exclude the others or strangers from interfering with their uses. By contrast, if 
the lawyer knows only that A, B, and C all have rights to exclude, she will not be able 
to predict whether A has a fee simple, a right of access or so forth. Nor will she be able 
to predict in what circumstances or against which parties A, B, or C will be able to 
assert exclusionary power. 
(emphasis added); Claeys, Property 101, supra note 15, at 632–33 (stating that the right of 
exclusive use determination focuses on external assets, and hence it explains why an 
employment contract does not give rise to a bundle of property rights). The rights that accrue in 
such contract arise by virtue of mutually enforceable promises, not by virtue of an owner’s 
interest in setting priorities for using a lot of land or a car. It refers not to a nominalist claim 
about property, but to a robust and coordinated set of property rights. Exclusive use 
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increasingly concerned with governing relations among multiple 
owners and users of resources, rather than excluding nonowners. For 
Gregory Alexander, property has become “governance property.”223 
Governance property describes a situation where simultaneously 
existing entitlements to some resource are shared between multiple 
owners.224 Governance property institutions are thriving in every area 
of social life, from the various cotenancy forms available to families, to 
common interest communities, to modern leaseholds, to business 
partnerships or close corporations. For these forms of property, 
excluding nonowners is only one aspect, not the most important. 
Rather, these forms of property require an internal governance regime 
that allows the multiple owners to use the resource.225 
The tree concept of property accommodates the complexity of 
property. In this respect, it mediates between the bundle of rights 
concept and the ownership model. It acknowledges that property has a 
structure, but it emphasizes the complexity of this structure.226 By 
envisioning the trunk of the tree as the owner’s control over the use of 
the resource, it acknowledges that the core of property is more than 
exclusion. It is use governance. By outlining many branches of the 
property tree, it accounts for the fact that both the common law and 
 
determination explains why all the various rights that go into the bundle belong there. Id.; see 
also Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions, supra note 15, at 210; Katz, supra note 18, at 236, 239–
240; Mossoff, supra note 18, at 255 (“[T]he right to property secures a use-right in, agenda-setting 
control over, or a sphere of liberty in using this thing.”).  
 223.  Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1854, 1854–60 (2012). 
 224.  Id. at 1856: 
Governance property, by contrast, is multiple-ownership property. Because of the 
relationship between an owner’s rights and interests, GP requires governance 
norms—the devices regulating ownership’s internal relations. Those rights may be as 
robust as full ownership rights, including coterminous rights to use, possess, manage, 
and transfer the asset; the rights could also be more limited, such as use rights with 
respect to assets owned by others. The fragmentation of various sorts of coincident 
rights with respect to some asset is what distinguishes GP from EP and creates the 
need for norms that govern the exercise of those rights. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  DAGAN, supra note 24, at 10. For a discussion of structural pluralism, see Alexander, 
supra note 14, at 1018 n.18 (explaining that pluralism, in a structural sense, is whether property 
law facilitates diverse social and resource realms—say a la Michael Walzer, the domestic realm, 
the commercial realm, the realm of intellectual property, the realm of residential rental 
property, and so on—each of which is governed by a different value or balance within a set of 
values). Two important examples of theories of property informed by structural pluralism are 
Hanoch Dagan’s and Jeremy Waldron’s theories. Hanoch Dagan conceptualizes property as a set 
of property institutions bearing a family resemblance but taking on different forms in different 
“social settings” or for different resources. DAGAN, supra note 24, at 3–36. Jeremy Waldron has 
also proposed a somewhat “structurally pluralistic” theory of property that distinguishes 
between one concept of property (the organizing idea that property is the right to exclusively 
determine by whom and how a resource will be used) and many conceptions (the many set of 
property rules). WALDRON, supra note 215, at 52–53. 
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the civil law accommodate a variety of resource-specific property 
regimes, tailored to the characteristics and interests implicated by 
specific resources. The tree concept of property may be seen as the 
progenitor of contemporary theories of structural pluralism in 
property. However, it differs from Hanoch Dagan’s pluralistic theory 
of property “institutions” in two respects. First, while Dagan describes 
property as an umbrella for many different property institutions, the 
image of the trunk of the tree suggests a more robust core. Second, in 
Dagan’s account, each property institution is “designed to match the 
specific balance of values suited to the specific social context (family, 
business, etc.).”227 By contrast, the idea of property’s social context is 
not discussed by the theorists of the tree concept and is probably far 
from their cultural and methodological mindset. 
B. Property and Value Pluralism 
The development of the tree concept of property marks a 
crucial moment in the history of Western property law: the moment 
when value pluralism became the focus of the normative discourse of 
property lawyers. The theorists of the tree concept reacted to Fascist 
property theory, with its exclusive concern with productive efficiency, 
and embraced value pluralism. The ownership model is concerned 
with promoting one value, negative freedom. The bundle of rights 
model has little to say on the question of values. By contrast, the tree 
concept facilitates a debate over which values ownership of specific 
resources should promote. 
The ownership model of property sees one value as 
fundamental: autonomy, conceived as negative freedom. The 
ownership model was the product of the French Revolution. The 
French Revolution enshrined in the constitutional documents of 
modern France (and Europe) the idea that full property rights foster 
individual liberty, which had been the central theme of seventeenth-
century liberal political theory, Physiocratic economic thought, and a 
century-long tradition of natural law.228 French jurists of the 
 
 227.  Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1868198. 
 228.  For discussion on the centrality of ownership to the revolutionary ideology, see 
RODOTÀ, supra note 115, chs. 1–2; Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith, What Was Property? 
Legal Dimensions of the Social Questions in France (1789-1848), 128 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 200, 
200–10 (1984). For more information on the idea of ownership in the Physiocratic thought, see 
Warren J. Samuels, The Physiocratic Theory of Property and State, 75 Q.J. ECON. 96 (1961) 
(arguing that despite the conventional reading that emphasizes the natural law foundations of 
ownership in Physiocratic thought, the Physiocrats’ concept of property, in fact, resembled the 
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revolutionary period worked to translate the political and ideological 
model of property into actual property rules.229 They awarded the full 
bundle of property entitlements—as understood within the old feudal 
regime to be split between multiple owners (typically a lord and a 
user)—to one owner and renamed the various feudal charges a simple 
rent payment.230 The result was the full, coherent aggregate of 
entitlements of the ownership model of property. Since then, for two 
centuries, generations of European property lawyers have rehearsed 
the benefits of the ownership model in terms of individual freedom of 
action and privacy. 
In the United States, the ownership model of property and its 
negative-freedom rationale have been a central concern.231 In the 
Founders’ world, the ownership model of property held a special place 
in law, republic theory, and society.232 For the Founders of American 
constitutionalism, the ownership model provided the inspiration for 
the idea of a private sphere of individual self-determination, securely 
bounded off from politics by law.233 Today, information theorists who 
embrace an ownership model with exclusion at its core note that 
exclusion is a delineation strategy that efficiently serves values that 
pertain to the domain of negative freedom, such as “stability, 




bundle of rights approach in that it allowed for the malleability of ownership for various social 
purposes). 
 229.  Paolo Grossi, La Proprietà e le Proprietà nell’Officina dello Storico, in 17 QUADERNI 
FIORENTINI PER LA STORIA DEL PENSIERO GIURIDICO MODERNO 360, 366–70 (1988). 
 230.  For more information on the revision of property rules to reflect the new revolutionary 
understanding of society and the end of feudalism, see James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil 
Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 462–69 (1994) (arguing that the change in actual legal rules was 
not substantive and has been largely overstated in the literature); Kelley & Smith, supra note 
228, at 200–12. 
 231.  David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a 
“Negative Citizenship” Regime, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 1–10 (1996) (arguing that the centrality of 
the property-liberty nexus in the American mind has contributed significantly to the thin 
negative concept of citizenship and to the fact that the welfare state is so poorly anchored in 
American law and public discourse). 
 232.  JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1994); Frank I. Michelmann, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1626–
27 (1988); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L. J. 127 130–35 (1990). 
 233.  Michelmann, supra note 232, at 1627. 
 234.  Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, supra note 7, at 282. 
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While the ownership model is monistic in its focus on negative 
freedom, the bundle of rights model has little to say about values.235 It 
provides an analytic model, but it cannot be expected to do any 
normative work. To be sure, critics of the bundle of rights concept 
argue that the model does covert normative work.236 These critics call 
this the ad hoc bundle conception. The ad hoc bundle conception 
analogizes property as ad hoc bundles that are “transparent to 
purposes.”237 Judges and policy experts, the argument goes, rely on 
this ad hoc bundle conception for directly promoting immediate policy 
goals. The realist social planner of the New Deal age tweaked the 
property bundle to advance redistributive or regulatory goals.238 
Similarly, post-Coasian law-and-economics analysts conceive of 
property as ad hoc lists of permitted and prohibited uses of resources, 
designed to promote the efficient use of those resources.239 
But, in fact, the bundle of rights model cannot be expected to do 
any determinate normative work. It has long been taken to suggest 
that the bundle is malleable, and hence any time the state curbs one 
of the sticks, it is merely rearranging the bundle rather than taking 
property rights. As many have suggested, the bundle of sticks concept 
may be used as a trump against state regulation equally well. This 
idea might seem to suggest that the bundle has a coherent shape, and 
any time the state curbs any stick, it should pay compensation. 
American takings jurisprudence confirms this observation. Courts 
have relied on the bundle of rights concept to reach very different 
results. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAT Corp., the 
Supreme Court held that a permanent physical occupation of property 
by a stranger through installation of a cable is a taking.240 The Court 
characterized the physical occupation as one that “does not simply 
take a single strand from the bundle of property rights. Rather it 
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.” By contrast, 
in the earlier case of Andrus v. Allard, the Court characterized the 
abrogation of the right to sell property resulting from the Eagle 
 
 235.  Alexander, supra note 14, at 1020 (“Regardless of their understanding of values, 
monists make the same basic claim. There is, they claim, only one fundamental value, whether 
that value is framed in terms of goods or principles.”). 
 236.  Claeys, Bundle of Sticks Notions, supra note 15, at 208; Claeys, Property 101, supra 
note 15, at 623–25.  
 237.  Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, supra note 7, at 279–82. 
 238.  Id. at 283. 
 239.  Claeys, Property 101, supra note 15, at 618–23; Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 368–
72. 
 240.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAT Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
3b. di Robilant_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2013 7:48 AM 
926 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3:869 
Protection Act’s prohibition of commercial transactions in avian 
species as affecting one strand only and hence not a taking.241 
More importantly, the bundle of rights concept does not 
promote the type of robust normative discussion about values and the 
type of social relations we want to foster through property that a good 
system of social ordering should require. The bundle of rights model, 
for example, does not explain why the abrogation of the right to sell is 
not a taking, while the abrogation of the right to transfer property at 
death is a taking, as the Court held in Hodel v. Irving,242 and later in 
Babbit v Youpee.243 The right to sell and the right to pass property to 
one’s heir implicate different values and interests. Also, an interest in 
land and artifacts made with parts of golden eagles are resources with 
different characteristics. However, the Court did not address these 
questions. As Gregory Alexander has noted, it would have been far 
more helpful and candid if the Court, rather than invoking the bundle 
of rights metaphor, had asked whether the sacrifice imposed on the 
owner promoted human flourishing and asked how tight the nexus 
between sacrifice and flourishing was.244 
While neither the ownership model nor the bundle of rights 
model satisfactorily addresses the question of values, the tree concept 
of property placed the question of property’s values front and center. 
The Fascist property theory’s utter lack of a normative discourse 
encouraged the tree-concept theorists to explore the normative 
richness of property as a system for social ordering. By insisting that 
the property tree has a trunk, the owner’s right to control the use of a 
resource, the tree concept restored the owner’s negative freedom, 
which had been vilified in Fascist property theory, to the discourse of 
property. By qualifying an owner’s use-control entitlements with the 
social function of property, the tree concept emphasized the need to 
balance, or fit, negative freedom with the other values of property, 
including equitable distribution and cooperative management of 
resources. Finally, by grounding the social function in the many 
resource-specific branches of property, it eased the problem of fitting 
competing values. 
The pluralistic nature of the tree concept suggests two 
thoughts. First, from a historiographical perspective, it suggests a new 
answer to the question of the relationship between legal methods and 
the threat of totalitarianism. In recent years, a vast literature has 
 
 241.  Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979). 
 242.  Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–17 (1987). 
 243.  Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 245 (1997). 
 244.  Alexander, supra note 19, at 801. 
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considered which method of legal reasoning, conceptualism or realism, 
came to the aid of European liberal judges and jurists who sought to 
resist the totalitarian regime’s distortion of the legal system. The 
dominant view among Italian scholars is that the Italian private law 
system remained relatively immune from Fascist influence because 
Italian judges and jurists used old-style conceptualism as a defensive 
barrier against the fascistization of the private law.245 By contrast, in 
Europe, many point to realism, building on what is known as the 
“Radbruch thesis,” from German jurist Gustav Radbruch who, in 1946, 
argued that it was the narrowly formalistic reasoning of European 
jurists that left them defenseless against the onslaught of totalitarian 
law.246 
The story of the tree concept of property suggests a broader 
point. Framing the question in terms of method (i.e., of formalism or 
realism) does not fully capture it. Rather, it was by broadening the 
conversation on property to a plurality of values that the liberal 
jurists who developed the tree concept of property sought to resist the 
fascistization of property law.247 They realized that theorists of Fascist 
property could pay lip service to the classical-liberal ownership model, 
while actually subordinating individual property entitlements to the 
interest of the Fascist state. Hence, they turned to a conceptual model 
that would open up the debate over property to a richer set of values. 
Second, from a normative perspective, the tree concept of 
property suggests some caution regarding progressives’ temptation to 
drop the language of autonomy from property debates. The myth of 
autonomy, defined as negative property-based freedom, has dominated 
American law and politics, eroding any possibility for a robust and 
expansive vision of equality.248 The rhetoric of autonomy mandates 
that the state stay out of the way. It has restrained the state from 
acting in ways that can be characterized as either a constraint on 
 
 245.  Michele Graziadei, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants; Italian National Report, 1 
ISAIDAT L. REV. 31 (2011), available at http://isaidat.di.unito.it/index.php/isaidat/article/ 
viewFile/46/53; Monateri & Somma, supra note 12, at 56. 
 246.  See generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the 
Fascist Period in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 101 (2001-2002) (discussing in general terms Radbruch’s theory that 
methodological formalism paved the way for legal interpretations that validated totalitarian 
outcomes); Matthias Mahlmann, Judicial Methodology and Fascist and Nazi Law, in DARKER 
LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE 232 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003).  
 247.  Curran, supra note 246, at 101–10. 
 248.  Abraham, supra note 231, at 2–10; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject 
and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 256–62 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare 
“Reform,” 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 287–94 (1996) [hereinafter Fineman, The Nature of 
Dependencies]. 
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freedom of action or a form of wealth redistribution. It has resulted in 
both a narrow view of equal protection that focuses on identity rather 
than on the distribution of resources, and an absence of constitutional 
guarantees to basic goods such as housing, education, or healthcare.249 
The frustration with this narrow discourse of autonomy has induced 
some to propose a different theory of the subject, one that focuses on 
the inevitability of vulnerability and dependency as a natural part of 
human experience.250 In turn, this theory of the vulnerable subject 
forms the basis for a claim that the state has an obligation to ensure 
that access to basic resources is generally open to all. The debate 
between the liberal theorists of the tree concept and Fascist property 
scholars suggests that the challenge for progressives is to rethink and 
thicken or expand the notion of autonomy rather than drop it.251 In 
times when owners’ autonomy (negative freedom) was under attack by 
a totalitarian state, the tree concept sought to protect negative 
freedom but to show that its relevance, and hence the way it fits with 
other values such as equal access, efficiency, or democratic or 
participatory management, varies for different resources. 
C. Owners’ Duties 
The question of the nature and scope of owners’ duties is the 
object of debate in contemporary property theory. The ownership 
model of property allows for minimal duties, conceived in negative 
terms and captured well by the old maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas. The bundle of rights concept does not emphasize duties. By 
contrast, the theorists of the tree model of property, by including the 
social function of property in the trunk of the tree, emphasized that 
property entails duties on the part of owners. These duties go beyond 
a merely negative duty not to harm others and include a positive duty 
to share certain resources. 
The ownership model of property conceives of owners’ duties in 
minimalist and negative terms.252 In the modern European codes, 
broad definitions of property that stress the absolute nature of owners’ 
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rights are qualified with a reference to the legislative prohibitions that 
ensure the harmonious coexistence of owners. For example, the 
French Code Napoleon, which was the code of property, recited that 
property is “the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most 
absolute manner provided that they are not used in a way prohibited 
by the laws or the statutes.”253 These negative prohibitions included 
nuisance law, set back and height requirements, and the prohibition 
on erecting constructions on certain types of land. Also, continental 
European jurists developed the doctrine of abuse of rights, which 
many European codes included. According to the doctrine of abuse of 
rights, owners should not abuse their otherwise lawful rights. The 
abuse of rights doctrine can be variously formulated, and can vary in 
scope. Subjective formulations focus on the right holder’s motive or 
intent, while objective formulations focus on the right holder’s 
conduct. Objective formulations of the doctrine that focused on owners’ 
uses that are contrary to the socioeconomic purpose of property could 
have been used to impose significant duties on owners. But, by and 
large, continental European courts applied narrow subjective 
formulations of the doctrine that focused on the unreasonable or 
malicious nature of owners’ motives.254 
Contemporary advocates of the ownership model conceive of 
owners’ duties in similarly narrow terms. Owners’ duties amount to a 
basic negative obligation to avoid committing a nuisance. The 
nuisance rule “translat[es] from private law to public law” and also 
determines the scope of the police power.255 Whenever one party can 
enjoin the conduct of another without compensation, the state may do 
so as his agent, again without compensation.256 This approach was 
adopted by the Supreme Court in the widely discussed case Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council. The Court found that a regulation 
prohibiting construction on the beachfront in order to protect the 
ecological security of the coastline (a public resource) was a taking. 
Justice Scalia explained that compensation is required when a 
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land, 
unless the prohibited action would have constituted a nuisance as 
defined by the background principles of the state’s law of property.257 
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Larissa Katz has proposed an interesting variant on the 
ownership approach that allows for broader duties. Katz is among the 
critics within the ownership camp who argue that the idea of 
ownership is found, not in the exclusionary function of the right, but 
in the owner’s exclusive authority to set the agenda for a resource.258 
This definition of ownership highlights the public quality inherent in 
property. In other words, ownership is “the way that we publicly 
confer the authority on some, owners, to make decisions about things 
on behalf of everyone.”259 When owners make decisions “designed just 
to dominate others, whatever ultimate good they have in mind, they 
are exceeding their jurisdiction.”260 What is conspicuously absent from 
the social-responsibility objectives supported by the ownership model, 
progressives note, is wealth redistribution for the sake of equality of 
welfare.261 
The bundle of rights model is also of limited use in theorizing 
owners’ duties. With its strong rights orientation, critics argue, it 
cannot sustain an adequate vision of property as shared 
responsibility.262 For the bundle of rights model, the duties of 
ownership are merely the correlatives of rights held by others. For 
example, the owner of a shopping mall has a duty to allow protesters 
to distribute leaflets because protesters have a free speech right of 
access to property that has been opened to the public.263 This view of 
property as entitlements held by parties against one another does not 
allow for an adequate understanding of property as shared 
commitments to the use and management of a resource. 
In recent years, progressive property scholars have developed a 
thick theory of the social-obligation norm in property law. Gregory 
Alexander’s version of the social-obligation norm draws on the 
Aristotelian notion that the human being is a social and political 
animal.264 It holds that all individuals have an obligation to others in 
their respective communities to promote the capabilities that are 
essential for human flourishing. This obligation extends to an 
obligation to share property, at least in surplus resources.265 Some of 
the theorists of the tree concept of property proposed a similar notion 
of social function. For instance, as discussed earlier, Salvatore 
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Pugliatti’s discussion of agrarian property insisted that owners of 
latifundia have a duty not only to cultivate but also to share surplus 
land with landless agricultural workers. The debate over the tree 
concept of property is one of the earliest instances where an idea of 
social function that includes an obligation to share property made it 
into the discourse of mainstream property law scholars. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have retrieved from long-forgotten mid-
twentieth-century European debates over the tree concept of property, 
a new analytical model for property. This model has important 
advantages over the two currently dominant models, the bundle of 
rights model and the ownership model. It better accounts for the 
peculiar, complex structure of property. It foregrounds the wide range 
of values and interests implicated by ownership of different resources. 
It suggests that, at the core of property, there is a social function that 
justifies a positive duty to share certain basic resources. A weakness of 
the tree concept, I recognize, is that it does not properly highlight that 
property entails coercion. This aspect remains unique to the bundle of 
rights model. Hohfeld’s table of correlatives is not only a matter of 
analytical clarity. It also foregrounds the fact that the right-duty 
relation confers significant economic power over others to the right 
holder. 
The retrieval of the tree concept of property is a timely 
contribution to property lawyers’ search for new ways of 
conceptualizing property. In the United States, the regulatory 
dilemmas posed by specific resources, such as the unbounded home or 
ecologically sensitive natural resources, have led to an increasing 
specialization of property rules. This specialization also demands new 
analytical tools. Property lawyers have responded by proposing 
alternatives to the two dominant models: property as a leaky bucket of 
gambles,266 property as a web of interests,267 and property as a 
prism.268 The tree concept is an important addition to this menu of 
property concepts. 
In Europe, the tree concept of property can help expand and 
refocus the debate over the harmonization of European property law. 
The need for a new conceptual model of property is one of the central 
themes in the debate. Property experts agree that the European 
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member-states share a property tradition, the classical model (i.e., the 
ownership model), and that a modern model of property is needed. 
They seem to have forgotten that, for a brief moment in the mid-
twentieth century, Europe did have an alternative model. The tree 
concept of property is the entry point for the debate over this modern, 
harmonized European property. 
 
